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THE, NATURAL GAS ACT EXPERIENCE - A STUDY IN
REGULATORY AGGRESSION AND CONGRESSIONAL
FAILURE TO CONTROL THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS
William J. Flittie* and James L. Armour* *
"If the Commission had foreshadowed its present course,
I do not suppose the Act would have passed...."'
T HE growth of regulatory power of the federal government at the
expense of jurisdiction of the state governments is a central
phenomenon of these days. Nowhere is this better illustrated than
in the experience of the natural gas industry. A modest congressional
purpose to close with federal regulation a specific regulatory gap in
which, by reason of previous Supreme Court decisions, the states were
constitutionally forbidden to regulate, has been transformed into an
aggressive instrument. As a result the states are being thrust from
regulatory areas in which the Congress intended they should remain
secure. Perhaps the short term economic interests of natural gas con-
sumers have benefitted, though a case can as well be made to the
contrary. But to the extent the governmental machinery of this nation
with its division of powers between state and national governments
and its checks and balances among executive, legislative and judicial
branches has been damaged, gas consumers, and all other citizens, are
poorer beyond any dollar recompense.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATURAL GAS ACT2
In the constitutional law as it stood in 1938 the states had undoubted
power to regulate or not regulate, as they saw fit, the rates at which
consumers of natural gas were supplied by local distributors, a power
they still have, though now by sufferance of the federal government
rather than by virtue of a constitutional barrier against federal en-
croachment. But due to the Supreme Court's Missouri v. Kansas Na-
*Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.Sc.L., University of Minnesota;
LL.B., Columbia University; formerly Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Industrial Commis-
sioner, Commissioner of Labor, State of South Dakota, Attorney for Texaco, Inc.
*LL.B., Vanderbilt University, LL.M. candidate Southern Methodist University 1964-
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1 FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 488 (1950) (dissenting opinion of Jackson,J).
2 52 Stat. 821 (1938) as amended 56 Stat. 83 (1942), 61 Stat. 459 (1947), 68 Stat.
(1954), 72 Stat. 947 (1958), 76 Stat. 72 (1962), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1958).
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tural Gas Co.' and Public Util. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam
& Elec. Co.' decisions of the mid 1920's, in all situations but those in
which the facts of a case showed the federal interest to be minor,5
there was no state power to regulate the rates at which the interstate
pipeline companies sold gas to local distributors for resale. This power,
the Court held, belonged exclusively to the federal government, and,
because the Congress had not implemented it with legislation, there
was an unregulated gap.
Due to low demand in relation to supply in the period after World
War I, the field price of natural gas was extremely low.' While con-
trolling a substantial portion of their pipeline requirements in terms
of their own production,7 interstate pipelines were able to contract for
additonal needed supplies from independent producers at what
amounted to distress prices. Local distribution companies, then as
now, were dependent on the main line transporters for supplies of
natural gas.
The interstate lines were accused of selling gas to local distributors
at unreasonable markups.8 In the absence of any regulation of those
sales, the state regulatory agencies were forced, under usual principles
of public utility law, to reflect the unregulated prices which local
distributors paid in the rates consumers ultimately paid in the same
fashion that, today, the unregulated cost of coal is a cost of service
element in the regulated rates of electricity generated with its heat
content.
Because of this situation, in 1928 the Federal Trade Commission was
directed to investigate the entire structure of the natural gas industry.9
In a series of reports culminating in its 1936 Final Report" the
3265 U.S. 298 (1924).
4 273 U.S. 83 (1927). This case involves sale of electricity across a state line. There
never has been any question but that its precedent applied to natural gas sales as well.
5 The Court decided these cases in terms of practical impact of state regulation upon the
federal interest rather than any mechanical test where exclusiveness automatically resulted if
a state line was crossed, as demonstrated by Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 304 U.S. 61 (1938) involving informational reporting; Southern Natural Gas Co.
v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937) upholding state taxation; and particularly Lone Star Gas
Co. v. Texas, 304 U.S. 224 (1938), permitting state ratemaking at precisely the point of
sale for resale where state regulation was forbidden in usual circumstances.
6 Between 1922 and 1929 the average price of gas in the Southwest fell from 8 cents per
m.c.f. to 3.3 cents per m.c.f. In 1940 the average price of gas from all areas was 1.8 cents.
McKIE, THE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS 12 (1957).
As late as 1940 eight major interstate pipelines produced over 47% of the gas they sold
in interstate commerce. H.R. Rep. No. 992, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1955). See Hardwicke,
Some Consequences of Fears by Independent Producers of Federal Regulations, 19 Law & Con-
temp. Prob. 342, 348 (1954). See also Note, FPC Regulation of Independent Producers of
Natural Gas, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 549 (1962).
8 Douglas, The Case for the Consumer of Natural Gas, 44 Geo. L.J. 566, 584 (1956).
9S. Res. 83, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928), extended by S.J. Res. 115, 73rd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934).
10 F.T.C., Final Report, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 84-A (1936).
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FTC concluded that prices charged local distributing companies indeed
were excessive and recommended regulation of these sales in a com-
plementary scheme where the federal government would regulate what
the states constitutionally could not.1
Recognizing that the Supreme Court in 1932 had held the produc-
tion of crude oil to be a mining operation subject to state regulation,
the FTC concluded that natural gas production had the same status.12
It confined itself in this regard to urging the states to adopt regulatory
schemes designed to prevent waste occasioned by excessive gas pro-
duction and consequent dump prices.1" Local distributor regulation
also was recognized as a state function. In sum, the legislative recom-
mendations of the FTC report were directed solely at the interstate
pipeline-local distributor gap. Section 1 of the Natural Gas Act in-
dicates that the FTC recommendations were the measure of congres-
sional concern in its passage.1"
The progenitor of the Natural Gas Act was prepared in 1935 at
the direction of Congressman Rayburn and was modeled upon a
parallel portion of the already drafted Federal Power Act.15 It was
included as Title III of the Public Utility Act of 1935, Title I of that
act being the Holding Company Act"6 and Title II the Federal Power
Act.' The Federal Power Act was in part the result of a parallel in-
vestigation by the FTC of the interstate electric industry and was
designed to close by federal regulation the corresponding unregulated
gap in that industry."
Title III was withdrawn from the Public Utility Act. A redraft was
introduced in 1936 but failed of passage. In 1937 the same redraft was
introduced, subjected to extensive consideration and debate in House
and Senate, and with minor alterations enacted in the second session
of the Seventy-Fifth Congress as the Natural Gas Act of 1938.1'
Structurally, it is a limited statute purporting to deal only with inter-
state transmissions of gas as defined in the act;2" it is further limited,
however, so that the Federal Power Commission has jurisdiction only
over transportations of such gas, sales for resale of such gas and
11 Id. at 609, 616.
12 Id. at 603, citing Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210
(1932).
13 Id. at 616.
14 Natural Gas Act § l(a), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1958).
15 DeVane, Highlights of Legislative History of the Federal Power Act of 1935 and the
Natural Gas Act of 1938, 14 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 30, 38 (1945).
1649 Stat. 803 (1935), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1958).
1749 Stat. 838 (1935) as amended 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824h (1958).
18 DeVane, supra, note 15, at 30.
19 Id. at 39.2 0 Natural Gas Act, §§ 1(b) and 2(7), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717a, b(1958).
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companies engaged in either such transportations or sales for resale.21
Thus consumer sales, even though there is an interstate transmission,
are not subject to the act though the transportation and the company
transporting the gas for direct consumer sales are.2 Local distribution
of gas and the production or gathering of gas are expressly exempted,"
and, structurally, the act does not reach any components of a gas
system confined entirely within the boundaries of a single state.
A. Committee Reports
It must be appreciated that a federal statute is not interpreted in
the isolation of its language, but rather with a gloss imparted by the
legislative history which sheds light on Congressional intent.24 Most
authoritative in measuring the congressional purpose are the committee
reports attending passage of a bill.25
House and Senate committee reports concerning the Natural Gas
Act are identical, the Senate having adopted the House report.2 6 The
controlling House report states, in language as uncompromising as
the English tongue permits:
The bill takes no authority from State commissions, and is so drawn as
to complement and in no manner usurp State regulatory authority.. 27
As in the act itself, it is made clear that the guide for drafting the
legislation was the FTC report and recommendations.28 The point will
not be labored, for it must be acknowledged by any person willing to
engage in a fair reading of the committee reports attending passage of
the act that these show only the purpose to regulate where state regu-
lation had been held constitutionally impossible. This limitation once
was squarely acknowledged by the Supreme Court in language un-
mistakably clear:
The purpose of that restriction [the language from the committee report
21 Natural Gas Act, § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717b (1958).
22 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
24 The process is well demonstrated in Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S.
515 (1945).
25 Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 94 (1959). At an earlier time the rule appears
to have been that the courts would not look beyond committee reports to floor debate as a
means of interpreting a statute. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911).
This limitation has now disappeared. Recourse to floor debate invites liberties, for it is more
than a little notorious that floor debates, if edited, will support almost any view by the time
the differing views of congressmen and senators have been expressed. The Congress should
consider adoption of a statutory rule of construction that courts cannot go behind formal
committee reports unless the statute expressly permits such recourse.2 6 H. R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); S. Rep. No. 1162, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937).
27 H. R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
28 Id. at 2.
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just quoted] was, rather, to preserve in the States powers of regulation
in areas in which the States are constitutionally competent to act.29
The report further states that the FPC was to have "no authority
over distribution, whether or not local in character."30
B. Congressional Debate
Congressman Lea, who introduced the bill in the House, explained
it as follows, "The primary purpose of the pending bill is to provide
Federal regulation, in those cases where the State commissions lack
authority, under the interstate-commerce law. This bill takes nothing
from the State commissions; they retain all the State power they have
at the present time . . . . ""' This purpose was explained in similar form
by Congressman Wolverton:
It is therefore the purpose of this legislation to close the gap now existing
between Federal and State regulation and control and confer upon the
Federal Power Commission the right, duty, and authority to exercise
such regulatory power in fixing a fair and reasonable rate for gas that is
a part of interstate commerce. It seeks to give similar power to regulate
and control interstate commerce in gas as now exists in State regulatory
bodies with respect to transactions entirely within the States.3 2
The same purpose was emphasized in the Senate, with added concern
over the producing segment of the natural gas industry and application
of the act to it.
Mr. Austin: Mr. President, I should like to inquire whether the bill under-
takes to gain control over the natural resource of gas -that is, the
natural gas of any State - to enable the Federal Government to control
it?
Mr. LaFollette: Mr. President, it is my understanding and I think the
Senator will find from a study of the bill, that all it attempts to do is give
the Federal Power Commission the right to regulate interstate transporta-
tion and sale and resale of natural gas which moves in interstate com-
merce.
33
Senator Wheeler stated likewise in reference to the jurisdictional scope
of the act: "It does not attempt to regulate the producers of natural
gas or the distributors .... It is limited to transportation in interstate
commerce and it affects only those who sell gas wholesale.13 4
There was concern over the possible spread of federal controls at the
expense of state regulation. Citing as an example the regulation of
29 Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 690 (1947).
30 Supra, note 27, at 1-2.
3181 Cong. Rec. 6721 (1937).
32 Id. at 6723.
33 Id. at 8918-19.
34 Id. at 9312.
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railroad rates by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the im-
position of those in local situations, Senator Connally inquired, "Is it
not also true, even though the [state] utility commissioners advocate
it [the Natural Gas Act], that whenever a Federal agency takes over
an activity such as this the State authorities begin to shift or lose their
responsibility?""5 Senator Wheeler said, "No. There is no attempt and
can be no attempt under the provisions of the bill to regulate anything
in the field except where it is not regulated at the present time. It
applies only as to interstate commerce and only to the wholesale price
of gas.""6
Despite some wording which appears somewhat loose to minds at-
tuned to think in terms of present-day commerce clause concepts, the
evidence is overwhelming that the intent and purpose of Congress was
to fill only that specific regulatory gap from interstate pipeline to local
distributor which had been defined by past Supreme Court decisions.
Not without significance, too, is the fact that the legislative history
shows the industry groups who would have been affected by possible
expansion of the law beyond this purpose quiescent, a patently incred-
ible performance except that they shared with Congress the conviction
that under the interstate commerce concepts then current there was no
possibility of federal regulation of them.
C. The Federal Power Act
The Natural Gas Act"7 and the Federal Power Actf 8 in their respec-
tive regulations of natural gas and electricity wholesales, are sister
statutes, quite plainly recognized as such by the Supreme Court, with
the qualification that the Federal Power Act lacks the Hinshaw amend-
ment restriction of FPC jurisdiction later introduced into the Natural
Gas Act."9 Both were aimed at the same regulatory gap. ° The Federal
Power Act is the more precisely drawn with regard to state powers
in that the statute itself expressly limits FPC jurisdiction to only
"those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States,"'"
3 Id. at 9313.
86 Ibid.
37 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1958).
8S 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824h (1958).
39 FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964). The Hinshaw amendment,
which ceded back to the states a jurisdictional area which the Supreme Court had held in
the federal ambit is discussed infra, § V B. See also United States v. Public Util. Comm'n of
Cal., 345 U.S. 295 (1953), containing much evidence of parallel purpose.
40 DeVane, supra, note 15. The controlling committee report for the Federal Power Act is
H.R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935)
4 1Federal Power Act § 201(a), 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1958). This
express limitation has proved no more effective a restraint upon extension of federal powers
than has the Natural Gas Act's legislative history. FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S.
205 (1964).
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whereas it is necessary to go to the legislative history of the Natural
Gas Act to ascertain that the same limitation was intended.
In actual physical conduct of their businesses a practical distinction
exists between the natural gas industry and the electric industry which
probably was more pronounced at the time of passage of these two
acts than at present. Natural gas, most commonly, is purchased by a
transporter and reseller while electric energy most commonly is gen-
erated by the same company which transports and sells it to local
distributors.12 Thus there is little difficulty in identifying the unreg-
ulated single sale gap at which the Federal Power Act was directed,
whereas the acquisition by purchase from natural gas producers gives
rise to a multiple sales pattern in reaching the local distributors.
The possibility of any distinction between the two acts in this regard
was eliminated with the decision of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wis-
consin 3 in 1954, however, when, sixteen years after passage of the
Natural Gas Act, FPC jurisdiction over sales in the production and
gathering segment of the industry was asserted by the Court. Inquiry
should have been made in that decision as to whether the states had
power, at the time of passage of the Natural Gas Act, to regulate pro-
ducer prices, and, if so, FPC jurisdiction should not have attached.
That inquiry, however, never was made. Thus, apart from the Hinshaw
amendment exemption introduced into the Natural Gas Act, the
parallel between the two acts became more perfect than ever. Today a
Federal Power Act decision extending FPC jurisdiction at the expense
of state jurisdiction is all but certain to be conclusive in the natural gas
arena as well. This realization becomes a matter of some importance in
assaying the current validity of certain natural gas case precedents not
formally overturned.
II. THE REACH OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
At this point it becomes desirable to measure the reach of the com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution4 as it stood at the time
42 This distinction was appreciated at the time the two acts were passed, as is demon-
strated by the FTC's discussion of the difficulties inherent in divided federal-state jurisdic-
tion over gas sales as distinguished from electricity sales. F.T.C., Final Report, S. Doc. No. 92,
70th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 84-A 601-02 (1936).
43 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
44 U. S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have power .... To regulate com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ...."
Upon this modest and not particularly informative language has been reared one of the most
complex bodies of law known to any legal system. This development was inevitable in a
federal system of government, with its conflict between the powers of the central government
and the states concerning the boundaries of their respective authorities in commercial mat-
ters. The progressive increase in the powers of the federal government, so noticeable in the
past quarter century, rests more upon interpretations of this clause favorable to national
power and adverse to state power than any other constitutional source.
[Vol. 19:448
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of passage of the Natural Gas Act and as it has developed since passage.
Though difficult to pinpoint because the Supreme Court persistently
has interpreted the Natural Gas Act without regard for the con-
stitutional limitation upon the federal power inherent in the statute
itself, namely that it was intended to apply only where the federal
power was constitutionally exclusive, it seems inescapable that changes
in constitutional interpretation of the commerce clause after passage
of the act in 1938 have subtly facilitated extensions of the federal
power into areas supposedly reserved to the states. Were this not the
case, no regulatory area exclusively in the power of the states in 1938
could ever have been invaded by federal power. The Court, in its
interpretations of the act, never spells out whether it is acting on a
foundation of exclusive federal powers or on preempted concurrent
powers. There are strong indications that at times its decisions rest on
expansion of the exclusive federal power beyond what it was in 1938
and, at other times on translating what were exclusive state powers of
1938 into concurrent powers which then are held preempted by the
Act.
Judicial suggestion that the commerce clause confers upon Congress
a virtually unlimited field for legislative activity is not new. In Gib-
bons v. Ogden,4" decided in 1824, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated
that all commerce affecting multi-state interests is a unity and that
Congress has power to regulate that unity.4 In 1942 Mr. Justice
Jackson pronounced Gibbons to enunciate a scope of congressional
powers under the commerce clause still unexceeded.4 7 With the qualifi-
cation that the preemption doctrine of a later day makes the bite of the
federal power more keenly felt,48 this analysis of Marshall's view seems
entirely correct.
45 9 Wheat. 1 (1824). The Supreme Court was dealing with an attempted exclusive grant
of river navigation rights by the State of New York, which conflicted with a non-exclusive
grant of navigation rights under an act of Congress. Navigation is not a subject matter which
fairly tested the then-Court's attitudes toward ordinary commercial activities such as manu-
facturing or farming. The decision can be read as asserting exclusive power to control navi-
gation in the United States, ousting any state power, or as asserting federal-state concurrent
powers with the federal power prevailing in cases of conflict. Chief Justice Marshall may have
intended the former. 9 Wheat. at 207-208. The actual decree of the Court is consistent with
concurrent powers. 9 Wheat. at 240.
46 9 Wheat. at 194. And see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964). Mr. Chief Justice Marshall saw limitations on federal exercise of the commerce
power as something to be imposed by political rather than judicial means. 9 Wheat. at 197.
Decisions under the Natural Gas Act make it appear that the present Court is not sufficiently
sensitive to this aspect of the decision, though willing enough to use Marshall's broad concept
in extending the federal power.4 7 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
48 In some areas of commerce there is concurrent power in both the federal and state
governments to act, and state action is valid until the federal government acts so compre-
hensively as to preempt the area. When this happens, state power is in abeyance. Chicago &
Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560 (1873). Obviously, it can be difficult to
determine whether the federal action is preemptive. For an extreme example of an instance
1965 ]
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But Congress did not act to implement such supposed powers under
the commerce clause for a century after adoption of the Constitution.
The implementation began with the Interstate Commerce Act" of
1887 and the Sherman Act5 ° of 1890.
In the many years prior to these federal enactments, and for half a
century after their adoption, the Court developed an extensive body
of case law based on interpretations of the permissive reach of state
legislation where the state law usually was the only active element in
controversy. Absent conflicting federal legislation, only when the
federal commerce power was exclusive was fatal conflict found. The
lurking limitation if the federal power should be affirmatively asserted
in square opposition to state jurisdictional interests was not made ap-
parent until the commerce clause revolution of the early 1940's. The
professional and popular understanding which developed concerning
commerce subject to federal regulations was a highly restrictive con-
cept, with most gainful activities (notably mining, manufacturing and
production in general) denominated "intrastate commerce" and com-
mitted exclusively to state control beyond the reach of the federal
power." "Interstate commerce" became a term of legal art, descriptive
of the limited commerce area where the federal government had power
to act, and "intrastate commerce," a term descriptive of the remaining
commerce areas the federal government could not reach.
These localizing precedents unquestionably dominated the thinking
of legislators, judges and lawyers until the early 1940's. Their force is
shown when, in the mid-1930's, they were used by the Supreme Court
to strike down some of the early New Deal legislation because it in-
vaded the intrastate commerce area reserved to the states.5 2
where it was so held see Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957) where the
regulation imposed by the National Labor Relations Act preempted from the states all powers
to act in labor disputes subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board,
despite the refusal of the Board to take jurisdiction in the instance of a small company, the
operations of which had been characterized by the Board itelf as "predominantly local in
character." Such decisions create a "no-man's land" where there is no legal recourse.
49 24 Stat. 377 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
5026 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
51 United States v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1889);
Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568 (1852). In Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), the
restrictive concept was brought into conflict with a positive enactment of Congress for-
bidding the shipment in interstate commerce of manufactured goods produced with child
labor. The manufacturing limitation prevailed, ousting the federal power from an area today
recognized as one of concurrent jurisdiction and subject to federal preemption. This case was
the highwater mark of the restrictive concept upon the federal commerce power.
5s Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936); Schecter Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). In the last case the
Court forecast that if federal powers under the commerce clause were permitted to reach all
activities affecling interstate commerce, the authority of the state over their domestic con-
cerns would exist only at the sufferance of the federal government. 295 U.S. at 546. Most
observers would agree this is precisely where the matter stands today. The power is complete;
it is just a question of how much of it Congress has invoked.
[Vol. 19:448
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Though the restrictive interpretation of the commerce clause had
but a short life ahead of it, it underlay passage of the Natural Gas Act.
In the first place the real roots of this law are in 1935 when its sister
statute, the Federal Power Act was passed. In 1935 the restrictive
concept was in full flower." In the second place, while it is true that
by 1938 the restrictive concept was coming under active challenge in
certain congressional enactments,54 this challenge was made in terms of
statutes rested on the "affecting commerce" rather than the "in com-
merce" principle. The former denotes a more aggressive reach of fed-
eral regulatory powers than the latter." The Natural Gas Act is an "in
commerce" statute."6 Finally, there is not the slightest evidence in com-
mittee reports or other legislative background attending passage of the
act that, by this particular law, the Congress intended to put the reach
of its power under the commerce clause to any test. The indications
are exactly the contrary. 7
As often happens in the complexities of our system of legal develop-
ment through case law, at about the turn of the century there began
to emerge another line of cases based on interpretations of affirmative
federal statutes, such as the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the
Sherman Act of 1890. These cases supported extensions of the federal
power into traditional areas of intrastate activity where the lack of
federal regulation had had a substantial deleterious effect upon inter-
state commerce." The two lines of cases existed side by side without
conflict developing until in a 1941 Fair Labor Standards Act case in-
volving manufacturing, a traditional intrastate activity, the line was
breached in favor of the federal power."
Just one year later came the landmark decision of Wickard v. Fil-
53 Ibid.5 4 The landmark decision of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which finally over-
threw the restrictive concept, involved the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. In passing
this act, Congress very plainly did not acquiesce in the then prevailing restrictive commerce
concept, but there is nothing to prevent Congress from testing on the one hand and acquiescing
on the other.
55 NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963); Higgins v. Carr Bros. Co., 317
U.S. 572 (1943); FTC v. Bunte, 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
56 "The provision of this Act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate
commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public
consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas
companies engaged in such transportation or sale .... " Natural Gas Act § 1 (b), 42 Stat. 821
(1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958).
Interstate commerce under the act is defined as "commerce between any point in a state
and any point outside thereof, or between points within the same state but through any place
outside thereof...." Natural Gas Act § 2(7), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717a
(7) (1958).
5T Supra, § I.
58 For example, Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905).
59 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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burn,6" a holding so broad as to adopt into constitutional law the scope
of federal commerce powers urged by Chief Justice Marshall more
than a century before. Involved were certain 1941 amendments to
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 inflicting money penalties
for the production of wheat in excess of federal quotas. Unlike the
Natural Gas Act, this statute was part of the New Deal legislative
program designed deliberately to invade traditional intrastate areas
with federal regulation. It included in its reach all wheat production,
whether sold or consumed on the farm where produced. In sweeping
language the Court made it clear that even on-the-farm consumption
of wheat produced in excess of quotas, because it removed the farmer-
consumer from reliance on the market for needed supplies, sufficiently
affected the national market, and therefore the federal interest, to sup-
port the federal enactment.
Whether the subject of the regulation in question was "production",
"consumption", or "marketing", is ... not material for purposes of
deciding the question of federal power .... That an activity is of local
character may help in a doubtful case to determine whether Congress
intended to reach it. The same consideration might help in determining
whether in the absence of Congressional action it would be permissible
for the state to exert its power on the subject matter, even though in so
doing it to some degree affected interstate commerce. But even if...
[an] activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce,
it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective
of whether such effect is what at some earlier time has been defined as
"direct" or "indirect." 1
Amplifying on this case but in no sense broadening it, for its reach is
total, the Court has declared the federal power to be "as broad as the
economic needs of the nation,"2 and "if it is interstate commerce that
feels the pinch it does not matter how local the operation which applies
the squeeze" for the federal power to reach it.6"
It is regrettable that in its dealings with the Natural Gas Act the
Court has not seen fit to weigh the considerations it enunciated in
Wickard v. Filburn in measuring the extent of the congressional pur-
pose to regulate, but that aside, in terms of the production, transpor-
tation and distribution segments of the industry, the conclusion now
is inescapable that Congress does have power to legislate in all segments
of the natural gas industry from inception of production to the
consumer's burner tip. An industry characterized by an observable
80317 U.S. 111 (1942).
61 Id. at 124-25.
82 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946).
62 United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
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continuous flow across state lines of the commodity in which it deals
is completely vulnerable.64
Moreover, this power could reach gas systems which nowhere cross
state lines. The in-state use of gas diminishes the national supply. Its
price affects the price of gas in other states. The availability of in-state
gas on favorable terms influences the location of industry and hence
national economic development. 5
As of 1965 the conclusion is inescapable that the old constitutional
division between interstate and intrastate commerce is eradicated. In
the words of a noted attorney whose specialty long has been oil and
gas law,
I can see few, if any, of the significant areas of the oil and gas industry
that could not be reached by this [Wickard v. Filburn] test .... Other
than to point out that questions can arise under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, I find it difficult to question the pronounce-
ment of Former Dean Ribble of the University of Virginia Law School:
"From here on, it appears that for all practical purposes, the only com-
merce questions we will have arising under federal statutes will be ques-
tions of statutory interpretation."6
Since state powers now are a matter of congressional sufferance, it
becomes acutely necessary to determine accurately the congressional
purpose at time of passage of a statute, then keep that purpose fixed
throughout the life of the statute. Congress must now be especially
careful that words not intended be put in its mouth, for Congress, not
the Supreme Court, became the repository of the federal principle
which has been the guiding genius of American government from the
moment the intrastate commerce concept ceased constitutionally to
insulate local activities from federal regulation.
III. EXCLUSIVE, CONCURRENT AND PREEMPTIVE
COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISDICTIONS
According to Supreme Court decisions prior to 1942,7 commerce
clause applications fell into three major segments: (1) those in which
an overriding national interest demands uniformity of regulation (or
64 Illinois Gas Co. v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498, 503-505 (1942); Deep
South Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F. 2d 882 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 930 (1958).
65 Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
66 Searls, Present Status of Federal and State Jurisdiction In Connection With Regulation
of, Exploration For, and Conservation, Production and Sale of Oil and Gas, 15th Oil &
Gas Inst. 1, 6 (Sw. Legal Foundation 1964), quoting Ribble, Policy Making Powers of the
United States Supreme Court, 3 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER LECTURES 11, 37 (1961). See also
RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE (1937); and, FRANKFURTER, THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE (1937).
67 Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 350 (1913); Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Fuller,
17 Wall. 560, 567 (1873); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851).
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non-regulation) so completely as to exclude all state powers to regu-
late,68 (2) those purely intrastate in character and therefore subject
exclusively to state regulation,6 9 and (3) those subject to the concur-
rent regulation of both state and federal governments. With the 1942
decision of Wickard v. Filburn0 the second category vanished, leaving
commerce divided into the two categories of federally exclusive and
concurrent powers. Unfortunately, "interstate commerce" continues
to be a much used terminology.71 It has validity to the extent that it
is a defined statutory term as in the Natural Gas Act;"2 not otherwise.
Much loose legal thinking has resulted and will continue to result
from use of the expression, for it tends to merge pre-1942 commerce
concepts into later applications, on the one hand implying the existence
of an area of commerce the federal power cannot reach, and on the
other hand inviting intrusion of current standards upon statutes
passed under the old concepts.73
The category of concurrent powers divides into three phases accord-
ing to these same Supreme Court decisions:" (1) areas of concurrent
regulation where the federal government has not undertaken to
regulate and hence where the states can regulate until and unless the
federal government regulates in a preemptive manner," (2) areas of
68 The natural gas industry itself provides an example of this category in terms of the
various Supreme Court decisions forbidding regulation by the states of wholesales to local
distributors after interstate transmission, the unregulated gap which gave rise to the Natural
Gas Act. Cases cited supra, notes 3 and 4.
69 This now outmoded classification was exemplified by cases such as those cited supra,
notes 51 and 52. Broadly, goods not yet commenced on their journey across state lines or
which come to rest after such a transit were in the intrastate category and the interval
between these division points constituted the interstate commerce area.
70 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
71 Technically, perhaps a shadow existence of this category still is arguable. See Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). There is, however, no mean-
ingful existence of it when Congress chooses to regulate business activities. Id. at 267.
72 See note 56 supra.
73 At the statutory level, as opposed to constitutional level, the issue of whether the federal
power was intended to reach this area of commerce will continue to be hotly litigated, supra,
note 66, even though the power of the states to regulate has been downgraded from a matter
of right to one of sufferance, a consequence foreseen by the Court membership of the 1930's.
Supra, note 52.
74 See cases cited note 67 supra.
75 Apart from ratemaking situations, discussed infra, note 76, the treatment now accorded
state regulation of natural gas producers indicates that physical activities, including rates of
production permitted producers, constitute such an area. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n, 192 Kan. 1, 386 P. 2d 266 (1963), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 379
U.S. 131 (1964). Cf. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
Also, direct consumer sales involving transportation across state lines once were placed
in the concurrent jurisdiction category even prior to passage of the Natural Gas Act.
Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 U.S. 23 (1920), disapproved in East
Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n of Ohio, 283 U.S. 465, 472 (1931). Since about 1942 there can
be no doubt of their concurrent status. Because Congress has not acted to regulate, these
sales are subject to state regulation. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
332 U.S. 507 (1947); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. City of St. Edmond, 234 F. 2d
436 (8th Cir. 1956).
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concurrent regulation where state power to regulate is in abeyance
because the federal government has acted to regulate in a preemptive
manner,7 and (3) areas of concurrent regulation where there is no
antagonism between state and federal regulation, hence both can
regulate without preemption occurring. 77 Where there is preemption
in a concurrent area, it is, from the standpoint of the states, the
practical equivalent of the constitutionally exclusive federal power
category except that, not being rested on an absolute constitutional
exclusion of state power, state regulatory powers would revive with
repeal of the preempting federal law.
To complete this picture, there is one further limitation upon the
states in the concurrent area where state regulation is not ousted by
federal preemption. If a particular state regulation should impose an
undue burden on commerce, that regulation will be declared invalid.7
76 Taking the example from the natural gas industry, the Supreme Court has conceded
the states have constitutional power to regulate the prices paid producers for natural gas
even though destined for jurisdictional resale. Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas
Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950). Several years later, however, that concurrent power was held
preempted by the Natural Gas Act. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S.
44 (1955); Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 180 Kan. 454, 304 P. 2d 528
(1956), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 391 (1958).
In the following recent cases, preemption was found to be appropriate: San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Gorman, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), followed in several cases, the most recent of
which is Plumbers Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963), represents an extreme extension
of the preemption doctrine in that if the facts are "arguably" within the coverage of the
National Labor Relations Act, even the right to make the jurisdictional determination is
preempted to the NLRB. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961), is a decision of doubtful
merit ousting Georgia tobacco grading standards, though it was conceded these supplemented,
rather than conflicted with, the federal standards. The dissenters argued preemption never
should be found unless there is a clear congressional indication.
Though not strictly a preemption case, see also Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962),
where a mere Treasury regulation permitting joint tenancy with right of survivorship in
federal bonds was held to oust Texas community property laws despite no inherent conflict
and no revealed congressional purpose to oust state property law in the statute on which the
regulation rested. Cases like these demonstrate the likelihood of a considerable bias in favor
of preemption in the current Court.
77 State and federal regulation can coexist in a concurrent area without preemption.
Head v. New Mexico Bd., 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132 (1963); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). And see Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 292
F. 2d 149 (3rd Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 915 (1961), following Texas Gas Trans-
mission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263 (1960), where the FPC construed a gas sales
contract for the purpose of determining if a "most-favored-nation" clause was triggered, but
without displacing the controlling state contract law. There is no current example of active
concurrent regulation in the natural gas industry, but if Congress were to authorize federal
safety standards in the construction of pipelines, concurrent regulation probably would
result. So great is the state police power concern with the handling of dangerous sub-
stances like high pressure gas that a preemptive purpose or interpretation is unlikely.
78 See, for example, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959), striking down
Illinois regulations requiring interstate trucks to employ unusual mudguards, different from
those required in most states; and see Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945),
striking down state regulation of the number of cars permitted in an interstate train passing
through Arizona. It is entirely possible that state regulation of gas producing rates, per-
mitted under the cases cited note 75 supra as a concurrent area where the Congress has not
undertaken to regulate, nevertheless could run afoul of this test if such regulation resulted
in impairment of needed interstate gas supplies not subject to being readily remedied by
connection with other producers on reasonable terms.
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This sort of invalidity does not strip the states of regulatory powers; it
only requires adoption of less onerous regulations by the states.
The gas industry falls naturally into three segments: (1) produc-
tion and gathering, (2) transportation, and (3) local distribution."
Laying these segments upon this commerce clause pattern, the cases
which gave rise to the Natural Gas Act establish the transportation
segment, where the federal interest is significant, as one of exclusive
federal jurisdiction."0 By this measure the Court's 1963 decision in
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n,8 ' forbidding state
impositions of ratable takes from gas producers upon interstate pipe-
line purchasers, becomes entirely supportable. Although the Supreme
Court did not make such an analysis (but rather relied on a preemp-
tion analysis which flies in the face of legislative history), this was
an effort to impose state regulation in the forbidden segment which
should have been stricken down even in the absence of a Natural Gas
Act."2
The producing and gathering segment, including sales in the course
thereof, though it may have been immune as an intrastate activity in
1938, now is subject to federal regulation. However, the 1950 case of
Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co.,"3 squarely holds that
even the super-sensitive control of state minimum wellhead price fix-
ing is not constitutionally forbidden the states by the commerce clause
and makes it clear that this is a concurrent area throughout. As such,
the ratemaking function should not have been preempted by the
Natural Gas Act, as it was in 1954,84 because the legislative history of
79 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 691 (1954); F.T.C., Final Report,
S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 84-A 601 (1936).
80 See cases cited notes 3-5 supra.
81 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
82 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937), invalidating a Texas
attempt to make interstate pipeline capacity available to producers of gas in the Texas Pan-
handle, also can be explained on this analysis, though it was decided on a due process theory
which quite certainly would have no current validity. See also Republic Gas Co. v. Okla-
homa, 334 U.S. 62 (1948).
83340 U.S. 179 (1950).
84Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). Only the ratemaking
function is preempted. See notes 75 and 76 supra. There are two lower court decisions sug-
gesting that FPC regulation of physical facilities used in production and gathering, when
necessary to making rate-regulated sales, also are subject to FPC jurisdiction. Continental
Oil Co. v. FPC, 266 F. 2d 208 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959) and
Saturn Oil & Gas Co., Inc. v. FPC, 250 F. 2d 61 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
956 (1958). Of course, in these cases producers were seeking to avoid regulation because
sales took place before reaching jurisdictional facilities, and that posture goes far to explain
the court's reasoning. But as Judge Brown, dissenting in the latter case, points out, such a
holding scarcely is necessary to the regulatory scheme when the sales already are established
to be jurisdictional by previous decisions, quite without regard for the status of the facilities.
Despite these cases, it now is reasonably predictable that no regulation of producing and
gathering facilities by the FPC is likely to be sustained by the Supreme Court. If state
regulation of facilities should interfere unduly with the gas service represented by a jurisdic-
tional sale, the approach now to be anticipated would be to strike such regulation down as
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the act discloses no purpose to preempt any state regulatory powers but
only a purpose to regulate where the states were constitutionally pre-
vented from doing so. 5
an undue burden on commerce. Cf. cases cited note 78 supra. See Ben Bolt Gathering Co. v.
FPC, 323 F. 2d 610 (5th Cir. 1963), for an example of the difficulty in drawing the line
between federally-regulated interstate pipeline facilities and state-regulated independent pro-
ducer and gatherer facilities.
85 The Court in Phillips apparently realized the difficulty created by its 1950 Peerless deci-
sion, 340 U.S. 179 (1950), which conceded concurrent jurisdiction for its 1954 assertion of FPC
jurisdiction. In Phillips the Court hints that its constitutional standard for state regulation
in 1950 was more liberal than in 1938, the time of passage of the Natural Gas Act. 347
U.S. at 684. The necessary implication of this remarkable (and undeveloped) statement is
that in 1938 sales by producers and gatherers to the interstate pipelines were exclusively for
federal regulation. One must acknowledge that prior to 1938 there was no square holding
either way, but the FTC, in its massive 1936 Final Report to Congress, supra, note 10, which
underlay the act, certainly did not see it that way. In the Phillips decision the Court deli-
cately points to an ambiguous parenthetical insert in a portion of the committee report
attending passage of the act where, after stating that consumer sales were not to be regulated,
the report indicated sales for resale were different. Specifically, "sales by producing com-
panies to distributing companies" was the parenthetical example. This, however, was imme-
diately followed by a flat declaration that the purpose of the legislation was to occupy the
field in which the Supreme Court had held the states could not constitutionally act, and
the two decisions dealing with wholesales to local distributors, which created the unregulated
gap, were then cited. 347 U.S. at 684-85, particularly n. 14. This should have resolved
the ambiguity without more, though if it would not, recourse to the full legislative history,
which was avoided, would have left no room for doubt it was only the pipeline-distributor
sale the Congress sought to regulate, regardless of the latent powers it may have had. The
loose parenthetical language probably reflects the situation in the 1930's when the pipelines
did produce a large part of their own gas requirements. See note 7 supra. In any case
independent producer sales to distributors across state lines in the early 1930's were so
unusual as not to occasion mention by the FTC in its 1936 Final Report. Nor is there
development in the report of any concept of producer price regulation by the federal gov-
ernment. The suggestion of the 1950 Court would be more liberal than the 1938 Court in
measuring the extent of state power as against exclusive federal power has a false ring, for it
runs contrary to the whole trend of political-judicial developments from the 1930's to the
1950's.
In common with the FTC, the state courts believed the states had power to price-
regulate natural gas production, based on state statutes long antedating 1938, and in the
major test case the Supreme Court did not suggest otherwise. See Cities Serv. Gas Co. v.
Peerless Oil and Gas Co., 203 Okla. 35, 220 P. 2d 279 (1950), aff'd, 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
See also Governors' Special Study Committee of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission,
A Study of Conservation of Oil and Gas in the United States 206 (1964). Moreover,
there are Supreme Court cases arising around 1938 where reasonable state price-fixing
regulations, applied to goods destined for interstate shipment, were sustained. Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943); Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.S. 346 (1939). Con-
trary decisions of earlier vintage, such as Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925),
and Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922), are distinguished in these cases and
can be explained as instances of undue burdens on commerce instead of inherent lack of state
powers to price regulate. Also, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), had removed
possible constitutional inhibitions upon state price fixing well before 1938. At any rate, the
Supreme Court was reluctant to demonstrate the validity of its position beyond mere sug-
gestion. On balance it is all but impossible to seriously urge exclusive federal power over
producer sales of natural gas in 1938. But if there was not, there was no gap, and the Nat-
ural Gas Act was not intended to apply. Finally, even if there was a gap exclusively in the
federal control, the Court does not explain how a statute so patently inadequate to under-
take utility regulation of a business having no predictable relationship between cost inputs
and service outputs could possibly have been so intended by Congress. The failure to develop
firm regulatory methods in ten years of producer regulation speaks eloquently for Mr.
Justice Douglas' premonition that a statute so drawn should not be construed as covering
producers. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 690 (1959). For lower court
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Turning to the last segment, local distribution, one is met by a series
of outmoded Court declarations that this is an intrastate function ex-
clusively for the states.8" The area now is one of concurrent jurisdic-
tion8" in which Congress has not acted and is unlikely to act. This
segment is expressly exempted by the Natural Gas Act from federal
regulation in terms that should be difficult to invade by any interpre-
tation, at least beyond the point of sale to a local distributor.8" As a
practical matter, identification of the division point between the exclu-
sively federal segment and local distribution appears to be in terms of
the point of pressure reduction offtake from the high pressure main
lines which once marked the interstate-intrastate division. 8 However,
it is not any point of pressure reduction which marks the end of exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction. The real test is whether main line transmission
has ceased and local distribution is in progress. Successive pressure re-
ductions directed to anything less leave the gas in the federal jurisdic-
tion." Hence it is those points of pressure-reduction which coincide
with passage of the gas into distribution systems for marketing, as
opposed to further transmission, which rules the question of where
the federal jurisdiction ceases and local jurisdiction begins. 1
comment on the regulatory mess which has developed see Hill v. FPC, 335 F. 2d 355 (5th
Cir. 1964).
86East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n of Ohio, 283 U.S. 465, 472 (1913); Missouri v.
Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 309 (1924); Public Util. Comm'n v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236,
245-46 (1919); Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 88-89
(1927).
87 Cf. cases cited note 75 supra.
88 "[The Natural Gas Act] ... shall not apply to ... the local distribution of natural
gas or to the facilities used for such distribution..." Natural Gas Act § 1 (b), 52 Stat. 821
(1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958). Additionally, because the cited section is restricted
in coverage to sales for resale, sales to any consumer, as opposed to a reseller, are exempt
from the act's coverage.8OPanhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 322 U.S. 507 (1947). See
also Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369
U.S. 134, 136 (1962), where, instead of remanding for state court construction of a law
seeking to tax industrial gas sales as did the majority, he would have decided the matter as
being within the jurisdiction of the state power because the tax was applied after the point
of pressure reduction, citing East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 283 U.S. 465 (1931).
90 Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942); State Tax Comm'n
v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931).
91 Of course, a main transmission usually will serve a number of local distributions
successively, giving rise to a series of points of jurisdictional division. There is no difficulty
here, all are FPC-regulated sales, but direct consumer sales off the main line pose an addi-
tional problem. They may be viewed either as local distributions beyond the off-take point
or simply as sales in a concurrent jurisdictional area not covered by the act, and hense sub-
ject to state regulation. Here, though there is no direct regulation, the exempt sales are
made from and utilize portions of jurisdictional line capacity. In making the cost of service
allocation between jurisdictional sales and non-jurisdictional sales as these, the FPC must
indirectly regulate them by taking such activities into account in setting the rates for the
jurisdictional service subject to its direct control. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. FPC,
324 U.S. 635, 646-47 (1945).
A problem, unlikely to arise often since it is the usual practice for jurisdictional inter-
state pipelines to create non-jurisdictional local distributing companies for local distribution
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Since the effect of the commerce clause revolution of the 1940's
was confined to transferring the intrastate category of exclusive state
powers into concurrent status, Natural Gas Act effects should have
been nil, even though it be overlooked that a 1938 statute should be
interpreted in the framework of 1938 concepts.92 The act was not in-
tended to regulate, much less preempt, any concurrent area. Several
key cases show the extent to which these underlying considerations
have been disregarded in expanding FPC jurisdiction.
A. The Lone Star And City Of Colton Cases
The Supreme Court's 193 8 case of Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas9" was
decided just one month before the Natural Gas Act was passed. It is,
thus, the truest available measure of state powers contemporaneous
with the act. Under the facts of this case Texas Panhandle-produced
gas was transited across a corner of Oklahoma, with some small incre-
ments of Oklahoma gas into the line and some small Oklahoma sales
off the line taking place before it reentered Texas, where it was sold to
local distributors for resale and consumed. Texas regulation of the sales
to local distributors after the reentry was sought to be avoided on a
claim of exclusive federal jurisdiction. However, on these facts the
Texas interest was found to be overwhelming and the national in-
terest, apart from the local Texas interest, small. Following the com-
merce clause law as it then stood, and despite the superficial resem-
blance of such facts to those which had given rise to definition of the
exclusive federal area in which the states could not regulate, the Court
held the Texas Commission could rate-regulate these city gate deliveries
for local distribution, using the values of the panhandle producing
properties behind the Oklahoma transit and the value of the interstate
line in the rate-making process. The Court even went so far as to call it
intrastate commerce that was involved, 4 thereby suggesting exclusive
state power under the constitutional law of the time. But whether
exclusive or concurrent, this holding should have fixed comparable
operations as within the regulatory ambit of the states.
instead of selling directly, would be a situation where the jurisdictional pipeline was also the
non-jurisdictional distributor, as in FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950). In
order to perform its obligation to regulate what is jurisdictional in such a situation without
intruding into exempt local distribution, the FPC probably should require the accounting
equivalent of a sale which it can rate regulate before local distribution commences.
92 See FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 472 (1950). If a new constitutional
standard raised an absolute constitutional barrier against state regulation where there was none
before, the result would be to oust any previous state regulation, but this too should not
increase FPC powers under the act. It should simply result in an unregulated area susceptible
of congressional action if the Congress later chooses to regulate in it.
93 304 U.S. 224 (1938).
94 Id. at 238-39.
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It would be difficult to so conclude in light of the 1964 City of
Colton case,95 a Federal Power Act decision.
Here a major California electric utility wholesaled to the City of
Colton, California from one of its main transmission lines. By far the
greater portion of the power reaching the city apparently was gene-
rated in California, but power generated at federal hydro-electric pro-
jects in Nevada and Arizona also made up a part of the line load and
reached the city with considerable regularity. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in its decision,96 noted the express statutory exclusion in the
Federal Power Act to the effect that FPC jurisdiction was not to in-
clude any service that was subject to state regulation, ' then proceeded
to make the case-by-case analysis typified by Lone Star9" to ascertain
if, constitutionally, the California Commission could regulate the sale.
In part because the out-of-state power supply originated in sales al-
ready controlled by the federal government, but more importantly
because interests in no other state could be much affected by California
regulation in circumstances where, after entering California and there
obtaining the major part of its power load, the line never passed to
other states, the Ninth Circuit concluded there was constitutional
authority for California to regulate. Thus, under the express exemp-
tion the situation fell into a regulatory area where the Congress had
not intended FPC jurisdiction to attach.
The Supreme Court reversed. In what is unmistakably a preempting
decision it held that the general grant of jurisdictional authority under
the Power Act overrode the express exemption.9 In so doing it attri-
buted to Congress an intent to draw a "bright line easily ascertained"
between respective state and federal jurisdictions, eliminating the need
for case-by-case analysis.1"' Under such an analysis, of course, the rela-
tive amounts of in-state and out-of-state power in the line become a
matter of no consequence; if they were of importance there never
could be a "bright line," and case-by-case analysis would be inevitable.
The decision, by constant reference to the parallel Natural Gas Act,
leaves little room to doubt that it applies equally to natural gas trans-
missions. Indeed, apart from the Natural Gas Act's limited Hinshaw
amendment exemption, discussed by the Court, no basis is apparent
to the writers for drawing any distinction. If the express exemption
of the Federal Power Act is going to be overridden in a preempting
9 5 FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964).
9 Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. FPC, 310 F. 2d 784 (9th Cir. 1962).
97 Supra, note 41.
98 376 U.S. at 215-18.
99 Id. at 215-16.
100 Ibid.
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manner, the Natural Gas Act, lacking an express exemption to cover
Lone Star'' situations, is even more vulnerable.
But how can the Court find a "bright line" preempting state
powers which existed at the time of an act's passage in circumstances
where the Court itself, at the time of passage of the law, could provide
no line other than the one of case-by-case analysis, and where Congress
expressly denied any intent to preempt where fact analysis revealed
constitutional power in the states to regulate?
No doubt case-by-case weighing of respective state and federal
interests to determine if the states constitutionally can regulate is
tedious, uncertain, and distasteful to federal regulators even apart
from any desire to expand their powers. The suspicion cannot be stilled
that this is a policy decision which attributes to Congress what Con-
gress plainly did not intend, with the objective of producing, in the
eyes of the Court and the Commission, a more rational regulatory
scheme than in fact the law provided.
The case is a flagrant example of judicial legislation.' °2 Given the
increasing interconnections of both electric and natural gas systems
with sources across state lines from points of local distributor deliveries,
it implies a far more severe contraction of state regulatory powers
than perhaps generally is realized. It is certain to make the owners of
in-state gas or electric systems reluctant to participate in the national
and regional interconnections the FPC now urges in the name of
efficiency and cost reduction.'"°
101 304 U.S. 224 (1938).
102 Broad interpretations of congressional statutes sometime are sought to be justified on
the theory that Congress can repudiate the extension with legislation if it so desires. For a
criticism of this process see Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Func-
tion in Balance, 49 A.B.A.J. 943, 944 (1963). For an example of where a justice conceded
judicial legislation in terms of this process see United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S.
295, 320-21 (1953). Unless proponents of this view are willing to support the thesis of minor-
ity rule, the experience of the independent producers who twice obtained legislation relieving
them of FPC jurisdiction only to see both bills vetoed, after which they were unable to
assemble the necessary two-thirds majority to override the vetoes, reveals the inability of
Congress to always perform this function. The argument itself is, of course, a palpable per-
version of the judicial process. The two bills referred to are the Kerr-Harris Bill (H.R.
1758, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.), vetoed by President Truman in 1950, and the Harris-Fulbright
Bill (H.R. 6645, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess.), vetoed by President Eisenhower in 1956. The
first bill predated the 1954 assertion of jurisdiction over production and gathering and was
designed to avoid the possibility of any such jurisdiction being asserted as a result of certain
statements suggesting concurrent federal powers in Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331
U.S. 682 (1947).
103 The FPC's National Power Survey Report, issued December 12, 1964, urges regional
and national electricity systems integration upon public and private electric utilities. The
reward for participating in an efficient regional electric power pool, as demonstrated by the
Commission's opinion in Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., -FPC-- (1945), Opinion No.
458, is national regulation in lieu of local control. The City of Colton case, supra, note 95,
makes it virtually certain the Commission will be sustained in the position here asserted.
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B. The East Ohio Case
In 1950 the Supreme Court decided the case of FPC v. East Ohio
Gas Co."°" Involved was an entirely in-state Ohio gas utility which
purchased gas from a jurisdictional interstate pipeline company at the
Ohio state line. It then transported the gas through its own high
pressure main lines to its own local distribution systems in Ohio, and
all gas ultimately was consumed in Ohio. The issue before the Court
was whether the FPC could require the Ohio company, as a company
engaged in a jurisdictional main line transmission, to comply with
the accounting and reporting requirements imposed under the Nat-
ural Gas Act. The Ohio company contended that its activity was
local distribution, exempted by the act.' By the Lone Star rationale,
it seems quite clear there can be no significant federal interest where,
after an FPC regulated state line sale, all further handling and con-
sumption is confined to one state. The antecedent FPC-regulated sale
absolutely insulates and prevents any reaction back upon any multi-
state interest distinct from the local single state interest. But the
Court held the Ohio company subject to FPC jurisdiction. Though
never squarely saying so, the Court necessarily placed this segment
of in-state main line transmission exclusively in the federal ambit
by indicating that the main line transportation facilities of the Ohio
company fell within the regulatory gap where the states were for-
bidden to regulate.'
Thus the analysis method of the East Ohio case is right. There is
inquiry to determine whether the statute-imposed jurisdictional basis
for Natural Gas Act regulation exists. But, as trenchantly demon-
strated by Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent, the constitutional con-
clusion reached is very wrong because under Lone Star standards
there existed state power to regulate in situations such as this.' The
case is not to be justified as breaking a close question one way or the
other; there is not a close question by 1938 standards. Moreover, the
majority's result is conclusory and not a result of weighing respective
state and federal interests. The proper approach to the constitutional
question of exclusive federal jurisdiction was not even attempted.
Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent also is noteworthy for its realistic ap-
praisal of the bureaucratic urge to expand their jurisdiction which
permeates federal regulators and which must be consistently curbed
if the purposes of Congress are not to be thwarted by this desire to
104 338 U.S. 464 (1950).
106 The legislative history of the Natural Gas Act contains specific support for this
position. Supra, note 27.
106 338 U.S. at 472-73.
107 338 U.S. at 483-484.
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extract from the laws of Congress more complete regulatory schemes
than Congress intended."' 8
This case is a disturbing example of enlarging federal jurisdiction
by shifting the constitutional standard years after Congress legislated
its statute. When this occurs in a context where the changed consti-
tutional meaning does not impose an absolute bar, but involves a
regulatory area where Congress has undoubted power to fix the fed-
eral-state jurisdictional line, the Court usurps the legislative function
and, in effect, amends the law.'09
C. The Phillips Case
With the 1954 decision of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin"..
and subsequent decisions enlarging its thrust,"' it is today beyond
debate that independent producers and gatherers whose sales of gas
either directly or eventually reach interstate pipeline purchasers are
subject to exclusive FPC rate regulation under the Natural Gas Act.
The means whereby this was accomplished are complex. Phillips itself
hints that such sales in 1938 were in the exclusive federal segment,
though by 1950 they were not, a matter considered and criticized
elsewhere.11 2 The subsequent decisions, on the other hand, speak the
language of preemption. Since sufficient discussion already has been
directed toward both of these tactics, attention is directed to the
statutory construction methods used by the Court in Phillips.
The Natural Gas Act, as passed in 1938, contains an express exemp-
tion of "production or gathering of natural gas.""'1 These words are
illuminated in the committee report as follows:
The quoted words are not actually necessary, as the matters specified
therein could not be said fairly to be covered by the language affirmatively
stating the jurisdiction of the Commission, but similar language was in
previous bills, and, rather than invite the contention, however un-
108 In conclusion, Mr. Justice Jackson stated, "If the Commission had foreshadowed its
present course, I do not suppose the Act would have passed, for it certainly would have
evoked the resistance of state regulatory agencies instead of their support." Id. at 488.
109 With 1954 passage of the Hinshaw amendment the Congress did in fact restore to
the states a part of the state jurisdiction usurped by the East Ohio decision. See infra, § V B.
110 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
111 United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., -U.S.-, 33 L. Week 4503
(1965); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955); Saturn Oil & Gas
Co. v. FPC, 250 F. 2d 61 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958); Deep South
Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F. 2d 882 (5th Cit. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 930 (1958); Shell
Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F. 2d 900 (5th Cit. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 930 (1958); Humble
Oil & Refining Co. v. FPC, 247 F. 2d 903 (5th Cit. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 930
(1958); Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F. 2d 904 (5th Cit. 1957); N. B. Hunt Trust v.
FPC, 236 F. 2d 828 (5th Cit. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 970 (1957); Cities Serv. Gas
Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 180 Kan. 454, 304 P. 2d 528 (1956), rev'd per curiam,
355 U.S. 391 (1958).
112 Supra, note 85.
113 Natural Gas Act § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958).
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founded, that the elimination of the negative language would broaden the
scope of the act, the committee has included it in this bill.
1 1 4
It could scarcely be plainer that congressional understanding placed
production and gathering in the then-extant category of constitutional
intrastate activity which was inherently immune from federal regula-
tion.
Even were one to concede, arguendo, exclusive jurisdiction in the
federal government over these sales, so obviously is the act a conven-
tional utility law in its rate regulation aspects, and so obviously is the
producer problem not susceptible of such regulation, that the correct
statutory interpretation should have been to leave the producers in
unregulated status until Congress saw fit appropriately to implement
its powers.
In the face of these indications of congressional purpose the method
followed by the Court was to read the act literally, with so superficial
an inquiry into its legislative history as to amount to no inquiry at
all. By the narrowest of constructions an intent to regulate producer
sales was found in the phrasing of the jurisdictional exception of pro-
ducing or gathering. The Court said that had Congress intended to
limit FPC jurisdiction to interstate pipelines it should not have used
the disjunctive expression of transportation or sales, but the conjunc-
tive form, transportation and sales.115 A moment's reflection will
demonstrate transportation or sales still makes sense without attrib-
uting to the phrasing any such critical meaning. Not all gas trans-
ported is for sale for resale. Some transportation is related to non-
jurisdictional consumer sales, and a purpose of the act is to keep this
transportation jurisdictional even though the sale is not.1 '
Of course, the real question is what did Congress mean? For a
Court that inquires into the legislative history behind a statute, it
lies ill in its mouth to attribute precise meanings to a phrase which is
114H.R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1937). Somehow the majority in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954) was able to conclude that this
language demonstrates an intent not to exempt producers and gatherers from rate regulation
under the act. Id. at 679, particularly n. 7 and accompanying text. After many readings
of the committee report and the Phillips opinion, the writers find it impossible to grasp the
thought process followed by the Court. For a directly opposite treatment of the same com-
mittee report language in the context of the immediately preceding local distribution exemp-
tions of the same statute see FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1950).
115 Actually the conjunctive-disjunctive dichotomy is not nearly so clear as the Court
pretends. Natural Gas Act § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958) actually
states,
The provisions of this act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale
... and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but
shall not apply to any other transportation or sale ... or to the production or
gathering of natural gas.
116 Ibid. And see infra, § V A.
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at worst somewhat ambiguous. Not much of the gloss of legislative
history was permitted to rub off in Phillips!
Phillips contrasts in strange fashion with the 1961 decision of FPC
v. Transcontinental Pipeline Corp.,117 where, to find a "legislative
history" which would support expanded FPC jurisdiction, the Court
went afield from the legislative processes of Congress to an unsuc-
cessful legislative request made by the FPC to a previous Congress two
years before the amendment there in issue was passed. It then applied
the intent found by analysis of this FPC request to the amendment.
As a matter of statutory construction Phillips does have its full
counterpart in the 1964 City of Colton decision11 where, under the
analagous portions of the Federal Power Act, an even more precise
exemption, designed to protect state jurisdictions, was read out of
the law.
The case developments here considered suggest that since about
1950119 the limitations inherent in the Natural Gas Act have been
subordinated to a policy of maximizing FPC control of the natural
gas industry through legal interpretations which are policy-oriented
rather than law-oriented. The effect of these decisions has been to
expand FPC jurisdiction out of the limited exclusive federal segment
upon which it was predicated and thus drive the states from what, as
a minimum, were areas of concurrent jurisdiction on either side of
the exclusive federal segment. State jurisdiction now is confined to
local distribution in the narrowest sense (plus the limited cession back
to the states represented by the Hinshaw amendment added to the act
in 19541) on the one hand, and to physical regulation of producing
properties, including producers' rates of production, on the other. In
addition there is, of course, the limitation on the FPC inherent in the
sale for resale structure of the Natural Gas Act. This is to say state
jurisdiction is driven back upon the express exemptions or structure
of the act, narrowly interpreted. Today a second generation of in-
117 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
.. 376 U.S. 205 (1964).
"'In contrast with the cases considered in the principal text, the reader should note the
earnest efforts to keep Natural Gas Act applications in bounds of the limited jurisdiction
intended by Congress in the earlier cases of FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337
U.S. 498, 506-13 (1949) ; Interstate Gas Co., v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1947) ; Colorado
Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 600-03 (1945); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591, 612-13 (1944). These cases involved the necessity of taking a non-jurisdictional
activity into account in the jurisdictional ratemaking function, and the Court was at pains
to demonstrate how no direct jurisdictional consequences were intended. The writers do find
one pre-1950 case, Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942), in
which the Court seems to have relied on a preemption analysis which cannot be justified, but
the case may be correct in result, as the facts developed indicate an exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion basis may have been present.
120 InIra, S V B.
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direct control cases, later to be considered, threatens to further restrict
the area still open to state jurisdiction.
Enough has been shown under the Natural Gas Act that it is appro-
priate to make an examination of the generality of recent Supreme
Court decisions. It is important to know the extent to which policy
permeates the work of the Court.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF SUPREME COURT BEHAVIOR
The writers of this article are compelled to conclude that the Nat-
ural Gas Act cases are not isolated aberrations, but symptomatic of a
recent Court performance which accords little respect either to the
limitations of the statutes of Congress or to past precedents of the
Court itself, even though these are of very recent vintage. The hard
fact must be faced that much of the present membership of the Court
has deliberately chosen to abandon the traditional adjudicating role
of the judiciary and embrace active intercession in the political func-
tion. One need look no further than the confrontation of viewpoints
which appear in successive speeches of Mr. Justice Goldberg and Mr.
Justice Harlan before the 1963 American Bar Association annual
meeting in Chicago, Mr. Justice Goldberg espousing a concept that the
Court's role includes guiding the dynamics of social change.. and
Mr. Justice Harlan embracing the traditional concept of applying
the law as written and decided."' Even more recently former Justice
Whittaker pinpointed the Court-induced fluidity of constitutional
interpretation commencing in the mid-1930's as "the ways and means
by which the repository of general governmental powers was changed
from the people and their respective States to the Federal govern-
ment.""' So serious had the matter become as long ago as 1958 that
the Conference of Chief Justices of the States openly called for more
judicial restraint from the Court,"4 an unusual procedure, and one not
lightly undertaken by men whose lives are directed to maintenance of
respect for the institutions of the law. One can only conclude that,
after much soul-searching, open criticism was deemed more likely to
preserve the institution of the Supreme Court than maintaining silence.
The attitude which today seems to permeate a majority of the Court
has the approval of an undefined, but undeniably substantial part of
our citizenry. They see the Supreme Court as the means of avoiding
the difficulties and uncertainties of the political process in attaining
their goals. Consider this declaration of the noted columnist, Walter
121 N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1963, p. 1, col. 8.
"'. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1963, p. 18, col. 1.
"Address by former Justice Whittaker before the Southern Regional Meeting of the
American Bar Association, Atlanta, Georgia, Oct. 23, 1964.
'"N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1958, p. 1, col. 7.
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Lipmann, a leading lay apologist for judicial activism, concerning the
recent question of federal court controls over state legislative re-
apportionment:
The dissenting opinion [of Mr. Justice Harlan] argued powerfully
against bringing the affairs of the state legislatures into the federal courts.
The opinion was, in my view, unanswerable but for one enormous fact.
That is that the unrepresentative state legislatures are unwilling to re-
form themselves .. . . In this situation ... for which there is no known
legal remedy, the intervention of the Supreme Court was the only way
of breaking the deadlock.1 25
Professor Kurland of the University of Chicago Law School, in a
preface to the Harvard Law Review's analysis of the Court's decisions
in its 1963 term, found the Court ceasing to be a court, and its un-
checked omnipotence frightening. In some of the bluntest language
yet spoken he concluded:
There is no threat from the states who are far too busy committing
suicide with the weapons that the court has proferred them. One of the
last gasps in the 1958 report of the Conference of Chief Justices,
an organization that appears to have learned its lesson and is now reduced
to its appropriate state of vassalage. There is no danger from the "liberal"
element in the community who are in sympathy with the results that the
Court has reached. They do not care who makes the laws, or how, so
long as the laws are to their liking. The time to attack the Court, for
them, is when the Court is formulating the wrong rules. It is then an
"undemocratic oligarchy" stifling the will of the people's representatives.
There is no danger to the Court from the conservative elements in the
community that have maintained respect for an institution that does not
exist. They are confused by the fact that the wolf now is wearing Little
Red Riding Hood's outfit rather than being adorned in Granny's bed
jacket. 126
A. Stare Decisis And Maintained Dissents
The doctrine of stare decisis means that a case, once decided, should
be maintained as ruling precedent in future litigation involving the
125 Dallas Morning News, Aug. 20, 1964, Sec. 1, p. 16, col. 2. For an able statement of
the hazards to the governmental structure and judicial system inherent in this attiude see
Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A.B.A. J.
943 (1963).
126 Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Execu-
tive Branches of the Government," 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 176 (1964). Just prior to the
language quoted, Professor Kurland suggests that a point now has been reached where it is
farcical to go through the motions of pretending to analyze the Court's recent decisions by
legal methods. See also Kurland interview, Court Feels Free to Decide What is Best for Nation,
U.S. News & World Report, January 16, 1965, p. 60; Hyneman interview, This Court Now
Sees Itself as Above the Constitution, Id. at 57.
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same issues. It is not invariable and immutable. 2 ' Courts do err and
in subsequent decisions may override their erroneous precedents. Con-
ditions do change, and, particularly in the area of private litigation
subject to common law development, this change must be reflected in
the law. But, so there will exist a predictable body of law upon which
men and governments can rely in ordering their existence, the doctrine
supposes there will be few errors needful of correction and, over many
years, the law continuously will appear so unchanging as to impart
an aura of great stability. Even more particularly, it supposes that
minority judges will accept and apply the decisions of the majority
in the future once their views have been squarely overidden in litiga-
tion decisive of an issue. If judges persist in efforts to make their
dissents ruling law with any frequency, the stare decisis principle on
which our society depends for legal certainty is subverted. Govern-
ment by law is thereby transmuted into government by men at the
changing whims of the current holders of supreme judicial
commissions.
Commenting upon one instance where stare decisis had been vio-
lated in recent years, Federal District Judge Holtzoff, an able student
of the workings of our judicial system, declared:
This is not an isolated instance in recent years of this justice writing a
dissenting opinion in an earlier case, then delivering the majority opinion
in a later case to the opposite effect without referring to the earlier case,
but completely ignoring it .... I am adverting to this circumstance as an
indication that in recent years one member of the Supreme Court has
attached no binding character to decisions of that tribunal rendered by
a divided vote, if he himself were in the minority .... Does the principle
of stare decisis, which is fundamental to our system of jurisprudence,
apply to them?
128
Should anyone doubt the increasingly fragile nature of the stare
decisis principle or the merit of Judge Holtzoff's complaint expanded
from one Justice to overall Court performance, he should study the
cases collected below."2 In this study he should note the recent dates
127 The current loose stare decisis practice apparently has its roots in the Brandeis dissent
in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-12 (1932), though the statement
there actually does not condone overthrow of decided legal issues which are correctable by
legislation. Cf. Justice Douglas, dissenting in United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental
Oil Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 1517 (1965).
128 Union Producing Co. v. FPC, 127 F. Supp. 88, 92 (D.D.C. 1954).
129Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), as now implemented by Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) and companion cases, holds the apportionment of state legislatures a justiciable
matter for the federal courts, overturning an unbroken line of cases to the contrary, most
recent of which is Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957). Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964), requiring of the states in their federal legislative apportionments the same pure
population standards as Reynolds v. Sims required for state legislatures, is part and parcel of
the same line of cases. See also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), striking down the same
Georgia county unit primary system which had survived attack in South v. Peters, 339 U.S.
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of the lately valid precedents, now overturned and, by comparison of
minority positions in a great many of the overruled precedents with
the lineup of Justices in the overruling cases, the persistent and per-
vasive pattern of maintained dissents which have become law. It will
be evident that, in recent years, minority Justices, unreconciled with
the Court's earlier decision, have bided their time and, with some
change in the Court's membership, ultimately made their dissents
ruling law.
It is interesting to speculate what motivates Justices who refuse to
276 (1950). These last two cases make an example of one of two dissenting justices becoming
the author of a majority opinion just thirteen years later and overruling, without reference to
it, the decision of a majority of the 1950 Court, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y.,
378 U.S. 52 (1964), dealing with compelling testimony from a witness granted immunity
from prosecution, overrules Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944) and Hutcheson
v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962). United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960), dealing with the right of a seller to refuse to deal, renders United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) unusable as a precedent, effectively overruling it. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), impressing the fourth amendment search and seizure standards upon the
states through the fourteenth amendment, overrules Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
and Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951). Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), on
the issue of right to counsel before a defendant is formally charged, overrules Cicencia v.
Legay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958). Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), striking down submis-
sion of the issue of voluntariness of a confession to the jury, overrules Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156 (1953). Still v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 368 U.S. 35 (1961), dealing with
fraud in seeking railway employment as obviating FELA remedies, effectively overrules Min-
neapolis, St. Paul & S. Ste. Marie R. Co. v. Rock, 279 U.S. 410 (1929), though that case is
said to be limited to its facts. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), dealing with the
right to counsel in non-capital cases, imposes federal sixth amendment standards on the state
through the fourteenth amendment and overrules Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) outlaws consignment agreements, at least for
major marketers, and effectively overrules United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476
(1926). Department of Revenue v. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964) applies original
package commerce standards to liquor, ousting state control of liquor within state boundaries,
as specified in the twenty-first amendment, and overrules pro tanto State Board v. Young's
Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936). See aso Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Co., 377
U.S. 324 (1964). Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), holding that a non-resident
naturalized citizen cannot be deprived of citizenship when a natural born citizen cannot, over-
rules Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). The statement by Justice Douglas, speaking
for the majority in Schneider, 377 U.S. at 166, "That view [that there is absolutely no power
in Congress to take away citizenship absent expatriation by voluntary renunciation of nation-
ality] has not yet commanded a majority of the entire Court," is an example of the main-
tained-dissent attitude. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), pressing the federal fifth amend-
ment standards against self-incrimination upon the states through the fourteenth amendment,
overrules Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S, 117 (1961); Bagget v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), de-
claring illegal a form of state loyalty oath previously accepted as legal, overrules Gerende v.
Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951). Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm'n, 372 U.S.
539 (1963), declaring the NAACP is not obligated to turn its membership list over to a
state legislative commission investigating communist infiltration of the organization, overrules
Barrenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1958); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S.
399 (1961), and Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961), dealing with investigations
into communist infiltration of education, basic industries and the newspaper business respec-
tively. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1962), invalidating a confession obtained from
an accused held incommunicado for sixteen hours, but without evidence of maltreatment, over-
rules Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). The violation of stare decisis on a massive
scale through the now current device of incorporating the Bill of Rights as controlling upon
state action through fourteenth amendment interpretation is tellingly demonstrated by
Justice Frankfurter in Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 746 (1965).
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be bound by the squarely litigated decisions of their peers. Obviously it
is a motivation of some militance for they know the principle of stare
decisis and the reasons for its existence as well as anyone.'" Pre-
sumably that motivation serves an end which to them is even more
important than the structure of the law. If so, by temperament, they
belong in the political rather than judicial arena. As judges they must
realize that in this way they weaken their own decisions as precedents
and invite their destruction at the hands of subsequent Court mem-
berships. If this assault on precedent continues long enough, destruc-
tion of our case precedent legal system will result and the rule of law
vanish from our society.
Perhaps they rely on future Justices who happen to be of the tra-
ditional school to apply stare decisis to the decisions they have rendered
rather than risk further damage to the structure of the law. If so, con-
sciously or unconsciously, it is a shrewd advantage they take because
this is precisely what future Justices of the traditional school likely
will feel compelled to do."'s This means that correction of the excesses
of the Court cannot come from within it but must come from Con-
gress, or through the process of constitutional amendment. These cor-
rective processes must be put in motion soon or the federal principle
of our governmental structure will be an empty shell. As can be seen,
the active thrust from the judiciary under this analysis is all in one
direction, and it is far advanced.
B. Statute Construction
While the principle of stare decisis has foundered in considerable
part upon cases involving constitutional issues," cases involving mere
"' McCulloch v. Sociedad de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10, 22 (1963). De Veau v. Braisted,
363 U.S. 144, 161 (1960), shows some of the Justices, whose maintained dissents are com-
mon, very insistent upon the principle of stare decisis where they believe the matter to be
foreclosed by a previous case with which they agree. Having dissented from the initial deci-
sion of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 374 U.S. 672 (1954), which had the effect of
bringing independent producers under the coverage of the Natural Gas Act, none of the dis-
senting justices maintained their dissents. To the contrary, with that issue once decided they
have proved rather strenuous supporters of the FPC in its regulation of independent producers.
131 For example, consider the powerful dissent of Justice Harlan in Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 589 (1964), in which this Justice pronounced the majority's position entirely wrong
on the legislative reapportionment issue and of the gravest implications to the future political
life of this nation. Yet in the next term we find him acquiescing in the decided rule in
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965): "Under compulsion of last Term's reapportionment
decisions I join the opinion and judgment of the Court .... " Again, in Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89 (1965), he acknowledges himself bound by the reapportionment decisions though
he considers them entirely wrong. See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), where
he acquiesces in the decided rule concerning the assimilation of fifth amendment standards upon
the states in criminal proceedings through the fourteenth amendment incorporation doctrine,
though he notes his reluctance because he considers the decided principle destructive of the
federal system of government. If this Justice considered himself privileged to maintain a dis-
sent he certainly would have done so in these situations, but he does not.
... Cf. supra, note 127.
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statute construction demonstrate that the aggressions of the Court
have not been confined at this level.
A fair statement of the principle which guided earlier Court mem-
berships, and yet today guides the courts of the states, is embodied in
an 1875 Supreme Court decision authored by Mr. Chief Justice
Waite: "Our province is to decide what the law is, not to declare what
it should be .... If the law is wrong it should be changed, but the
power for that is not with us."1 ' These words enunciate a principle
that is not transient with changing times. Any court, and particularly
the Supreme Court of the United States, ignores it at peril of eventual
loss of its independence or public support and respect, probably both.
Yet in the current term and last two terms of the Court, it is possible
to identify five instances where statutes of Congress have been squarely
set at naught by construing them contrary to their words and legisla-
tive history." 4 Such cases are not usual, but their very existence dem-
onstrates an increasing willingness openly to invade the legislative
function and declare the law to be what the Court thinks it should be,
not what it is.
Unlike these cases are the more usual statutory constructions where
the intended coverage is uncertain and where, within limits, interpre-
tations of extent of application could vary. In such a category is the
recent spate of cases involving section 7 of the Clayton Act, the anti-
merger provision of the antitrust laws. This statute forbids mergers
by asset or stock acquisition "where in any line of commerce in any
133 Minor v. Hapersett, 21 Wall. 162, 178 (1875).
134 See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964), abating convictions of sit-in
demonstrators because of later passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in the face of a gen-
eral statute forbidding such an interpretation of congressional enactments. See also Rosenberg
v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), excusing an undesirable alien from the summary deportation
consequences of voluntary departure from and reentry into the United States in circumstances
the Congress had considered but refused as not meriting any dispensation. NLRB v. Fruit and
Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58 (1964), where the Court, charging Congress
with failure to specify the meaning of "secondary boycott," held pertinent portions of the
National Labor Relations Act applied only to total secondary boycotts, not partial boycotts
aimed at only products of the primary employer sold by the secondary employer. Rusk v.
Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962), where, with completely illogical consequences, an alleged alien
out of the country was permitted recourse to declaratory judgment procedures concerning
his status so long as he did not apply for a certificate of identity as contemplated by statute.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 439 (1962), which for all meaningful purposes eliminates
the statutory requirement that a federal criminal appeal may not be taken in forma paueris
if the trial court certifies in writing that the appeal is not taken in good faith. Although this
last case has possible constitutional implications, they were not considered; it was decided as
a matter of statute construction. In contrast with these cases, and indicative that the Court
can also apply statutes very strictly, is the remarkably narrow decision of United States v.
American Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685 (1960), where the statutory requirement that an
en banc court be composed of active federal judges was so strictly applied that a decision was
invalidated where a judge, active at the time of rehearing en banc, had retired before the
decision was rendered. Yet a federal judge on retirement does not surrender his judicial com-
mission and is able to continue to function as a judge.
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section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.21 3 5
In a series of cases commencing with the 1962 decision of Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States,' though the Court pays lip service to the
test wherein more must be shown than a mere possibility that compe-
tition will be lessened, so tightly has the Court drawn the noose it now
is almost impossible to conceive a merger involving assets beyond the
de minimis level which could hope to pass the test. After three more
cases developing the thesis that Congress intended that all significant
concentration of business be prevented in its incipiency," 7 the series
culminates in the 1964 case of United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical
Co.3 ' where a joint-venture company to manufacture sodium chlorate
was organized by parent companies which were not competitors or
engaged in the manufacture of the chemical in the relevant market,
which was southeastern United States. Possibly each might have
entered the line of commerce in that relevant market had they not
gone together in the joint-venture. That speculation aside, it seems
logically inescapable that competition was enhanced over what it been
before the new joint venture cdmpany entered the competitive
arena."3 9 This surely should have been more than enough to pass the
statutory test, for that test even contemplates a lessening of compe-
tition which is not substantial. But the Court used the speculative test
of what might have been had the joint venturers entered the manu-
facture on an individual basis, and remanded for further proceedings
to determine if there would have been such independent entry into
the line of commerce absent the joint venture. This amounts to substi-
tuting for the plainly declared statutory test of whether competition
was lessened a Court-imposed requirement of idealized competition
for which there is no legislative basis.
California v. FPC14 and United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co."'
involve the merger of one major interstate natural gas pipeline com-
a5 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 64 Star. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18, § 24 (1958).
186 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
L37 United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963). See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments- 1964, 63 Mich. L .Rev. 59, 67-78
(1964); Handler and Robinson, The Supreme Court vs. Corporate Mergers, Fortune Magazine,
January 1965, 164.
188378 U.S. 158 (1964).
139 It might be urged that there were vertical anti-competitive effects because one of the
parent companies was a purchaser of sodium chlorate and would cease to represent a market
for its erstwhile suppliers. The Court's decision attempts no such analysis, however. Moreover
it is difficult to see how competition would be lessened in a forbidden sense simply because a
former purchaser of a product exercised his undoubted right to become a manufacturer, using
the joint venture vehicle to do so instead of going it alone.
140 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
141 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
[Vol. 19:448
THE NATURAL GAS ACT EXPERIENCE
pany by another, both being subject to the Natural Gas Act and the
merger having been approved by the FPC. Nevertheless the merger
was invalidated, the Court reasoning that here the competition sub-
ject to being lessened was for new increments of demand to be expected
in the burgeoning California market. It is unrealistic to find "compe-
tition" to serve a gas market in a pipeline utility situation which is
wholly subject to the pervasive regulation of the FPC before any
market service area can be entered.'42 There is only regulated advan-
tage or disadvantage, as determined by the regulator. Only if viewed
as portions of a policy-motivated Court campaign against bigness in
business do these decisions make sense.
Two recent Natural Gas Act contribution cases show the pattern
in the area of immediate interest. In 1964 it became evident that the
Court is able to find enormous powers, nowhere specifically granted
in the Natural Gas Act, enabling the FPC to expand its controls over
independent producers. Thus in FPC v. Texaco, Inc.14a the Court up-
held the Commission in its promulgation of a rule refusing to accept as
rate filings, gas sales contracts containing types of price escalation
clauses deemed objectionable, despite the fact that the FPC has un-
doubted power to prevent contractual price increases beyond the just
and reasonable standard from being implemented and despite the
Court's earlier declarations that the contracting function, as distinct
from rates permitted to be collected, is purely a matter of free nego-
tiation between buyer and seller of the gas involved.'44 The justifica-
tion for the changed position is openly stated to be the administrative
convenience of the FPC, an insubstantial basis for invading freedom
of contract.
FPC v. H. L. Hunt' stands for the proposition that a gas producer
who, under protest, has accepted a temporary certificate of public
convenience and necessity, conditioned that he will seek no price
increase during the duration of the temporary certificate (often a
matter of several years), and has commenced deliveries thereunder
cannot file for a just and reasonable rate during the temporary period.
Nowhere in the Natural Gas Act is there any hint that a producer
should be indefinitely denied precisely what the law says shall be the
142Natural Gas Act § 7(f), 56 Stat. 84 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1958) does permit
extension of facilities in a service area once such area is assigned by the FPC, but this limited
right is far short of permitting competition as that term is usually understood. Also, in keep-
ing with utility principles, service areas granted will tend to be local monopolies in order to
avoid uneconomic duplication of facilities.
143 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
'44Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1959); United
Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338 (1956).
'45 376 U.S. 515 (1964).
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normal basis of his rate collections. The Court found such authority
for the FPC in its broad discretionary powers to accomplish the objec-
tive of holding the price of initial service gas "in line," the "line"
itself being a Court-imposed concept nowhere found in the act.
No doubt it is because of Court precedents such as these that a
majority of FPC Commissioners are able to arrogate themselves to
declare, as they did in a recent case,
In the absence of a direct statement of what Congress intended, we must
attempt to determine what Congress would have said about this par-
ticular matter if it had been brought to its attention. We do not think
it sufficient to ask simply whether the states could constitutionally have
regulated the sales at issue here. Rather we are compelled to ask whether
a statutory scheme [the Natural Gas Act] which would include whole-
sale sales at one end of a pipeline but would exclude the same sales, from a
common stream at the other end of the pipeline, would make sense ....
We conclude that had Congress considered the sales here in question, it
would have treated them as "interstate commerce. "146
The subjective mental attitude disclosed by this statement goes far
beyond legitimate interstitial legislation, a process of supplying the
details of a regulatory scheme unmistakably outlined in the coverage
of a statute. This is administrative law gone mad, the creature declar-
ing itself equal to and independent of its creator. How could there
be legislative authority in a situation premised on the assumption that
Congress did not even consider it? Has it become impossible for con-
gressional legislative enactments to remain limited, even inadequate,
whenever the Commission or the Court determines a more complete
or rational scheme is needed? The Congress will do well to ponder the
implications of these cases if it proposes to remain master in its own
house.
V. AMENDMENTS TO THE NATURAL GAS ACT
A. The 1942 Amendment Of Section 7 And The Transco Case
Since its passage in 1938 the Natural Gas Act has been amended
five times, 4 ' only two of which are pertinent to its jurisdictional
reach.
Section 7 was amended in 1942 to give the FPC certificating con-
trol over extensions of natural gas service into virgin territory un-
served by any natural gas pipeline.14 Prior to the amendment the
146 United Gas Pipeline Co., 30 F.P.C. 560, 567-68 (1963). The writers agree with the
result reached in this case, see infra, § VII B, but not with any such reasoning.
14715 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1958).
148 Natural Gas Act § 7(c), 52 Star. 825 (1938), as amended 56 Star. 83 (1942), 15
U.S.C. § 717c (1958).
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Commission lacked authority to control such extensions, though the
line became jurisdictional upon extension. The legislative history re-
veals that the purpose of the amendment was to permit consideration
of (1) financing, economics, adequacy of supporting gas reserves,
feasibility and rate structure of the proposed line.4 and (2) the
desirability of the proposed line in terms of economic impact upon
competing fuels, such as coal, and their attendant transportation
systems. " '
From this amendment, in the 1961 case of FPC v. Transcontinental
Gas Pipeline Corp.,"' the Supreme Court has distilled a broad purpose
of waste prevention, threatening what remains of the state jurisdic-
tion over the natural gas industry. Under the facts of the case a
Texas producer proposed to sell gas in a concededly direct, non-juris-
dictional, industrial consumer sale to a New York electric utility for
use as boiler fuel. To get the gas from Texas to New York the services
of a jurisdictional interstate pipeline were required. Transco agreed
to construct the necessary facilities and, because it was a jurisdictional
company proposing to construct jurisdictional facilities and engage
in a jurisdictional transportation, applied for a certificate authorizing
it to do these things. The certificate was refused by the FPC on the
grounds of (1) preemption of pipeline facilities (not actually involved
because new facilities adequate to the service were proposed to be
built), (2) objection to the inferior end use of gas as boiler fuel,
and (3) price impact of the non-jurisdictional sale on jurisdictional
rates in the area from which the gas supply would come. In view of
the large use of gas as boiler fuel, which is being increased by current
FPC certifications whenever it conceives the improved line load factor
to be advantageous in reducing overall rate structures in jurisdic-
tional service situations, it is a reasonable surmise that the real pur-
pose of the Commission stemmed from its evident and strong drive to
assert jurisdiction over a maximum amount of gas and to compel sales,
if made at all, to be made on a jurisdictional sale for resale basis where
it can control rates.
The Court accepted the validity of all three bases of the FPC's
objections, relying on the expertise of the Commission in these mat-
ters instead of requiring analysis of the record by the reviewing
court to determine if the FPC's refusal was justified in the particular
case. But because it rested the case upon that portion of the 1942
amendment dealing with certifications of new service, now section
149 H.R. Rep. No. 1290, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1941).
150 Ibid.
151365 U.S. 1 (1961).
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7(c) of the act, 5 ' the Court's decision dwells much on the FPC's
refusal to certificate for the inferior end use reason.
In so doing there arises one of the most curious cases of statutory
construction which ever has occurred. Unable to find authority for
the prevention of a non-jurisdictional sale in the legislative history
proper, consisting of committee reports and floor debate, the Court
went behind the legislative history to a legislative request contained
in the FPC's 1940 Annual Report, which request had been imple-
mented by a proposed amendment closely resembling section 7(c) as
finally passed by a later Congress in 1942.15 The portions of the
Report quoted in the opinion urged that the FPC be given power
to certify proposed extensions of natural gas service into virgin terri-
tory so it could assess competitive effects upon other fuels already
serving the market and less valuable fronfa social utility standpoint
than natural gas. The FPC statement is highly tentative, indicating
that the FPC itself had formulated no firm policies with regard to the
end use of fuels. This language, the Court said, supplied the needed
legislative intent, brushing aside the fact that the very FPC which
had made the request did not believe, in 1944, that it had gained power
by the 1942 amendment to consider conservation of gas in direct-
sale-to-industry situations. 5 '
The import of this case, however, runs far deeper than the ques-
tionable manner of ascertaining legislative intent. To see where it
brings us the reader must, for a moment, cast his mind back to the
limited purpose of the Congress in passing the Natural Gas Act, then
consider the words of Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Transco:
[W]hen a dispute arises over whether a given transaction is within the
scope of federal or state regulatory authority, we are not inclined to
approach the problem negatively.... [W]here Congressional authority
is not explicit we must ask ourselves whether state authority can prac-
tically regulate a given area and, if we find it cannot, then we are im-
pelled to decide that federal authority governs.5""
The opinion throughout bristles with justification of federal regula-
tory action wherever, though state regulatory authority exists, some
states may be unwilling to implement their powers to prevent waste
in an acceptable manner. Of course, in a true federal system there will
always be varying state performances. If the national shepherd pursues
152 Supra, note 148.
"s 365 U.S. at 10-12.
1541d. at 15. The contrast of this reasoning with the opinion in Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965), another opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, is so great one wonders
if acceptance or rejection of administrative interpretations is more than a tool with which to
reach the result desired by the Court in particular cases.
155 Id. at 19-20.
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the lost lamb of the unenlightened state in this manner there results
the most perfect device ever invented with which to whipsaw all the
states under constantly increasing federal controls. The displacement
of state authority for the inevitable inadequacy of one or some operates
alike on all.
The FPC is alive to the possibilities of this decision. In a 1964 speech
Commissioner O'Connor suggested the 1942 amendment gave the
FPC at least some concurrent powers with the states to prevent waste-
ful production practices.15 The speech is interesting. Openly stated is
the penchant of federal regulators to define when state inaction is not
in the "public interest," then deliberately and for this reason to inter-
pret the reach of the federal regulatory machinery to fill the void -
all with considerable confidence in ultimate Court approval.
It is not inconceivable that the FPC might use its certificating power
to refuse interstate pipeline connections where it deemed producing
practices wasteful. Already it has been suggested that the FPC might
help the states in insuring ratable takes of gas from producers, Chair-
man Swidler responding that he thought the idea a good one and that
he would welcome such cooperation with the states.157
The control of non-jurisdictional activities through the FPC's power
over jurisdictional companies, facilities, and activities exemplified by
the Transco decision will merit close surveillance in time to come. By
preventing non-jurisdictional functions from being performed the
FPC can at once, in practical effect, further contract state jurisdic-
tion and often force the non-jurisdictional function sought to be
performed into a jurisdictional format, thereby effectively enlarging
its jurisdiction.
B. The Hinshaw Amendment
Inconsistent with the victory it had won in the 1950 East Ohio
case,' where it succeeded in subjecting an entirely in-state Ohio
main line gas transporter to the Natural Gas Act for reporting pur-
poses because the transporter's activities fell in the exclusive federal
segment, the FPC made no further effort to displace sole Ohio regu-
lation of rates.'59 It was content to have imposed its accounting pro-
156 O'Connor, The Federal Power Commission: A Commission Contemplates Its Authority
to Regulate the Production and Transportation of Natural Gas, speech before the Mineral
Section, Texas State Bar Convention, Houston, Texas, July 3, 1964.
157 The Oil Daily, Nov. 24, 1964, p. 1, col. 1. The states now are forbidden to impose
ratable takes on interstate pipeline purchases of gas. Supra, note 76.
L58 FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950), discussed supra, § III B.
159 The transporter was also the local distributor, hence there was no sale to rate-regulate
at the end of the jurisdictional transportation, unless the FPC imposed the accounting equiv-
alent of a sale at that point. Very likely the FPC won more than it desired to implement in
this case.
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cedures. This compelled the company to keep separate accounts for
the State of Ohio and the FPC, all at considerable added costs to its
customers.160 Pressure for corrective legislation developed, and sev-
eral bills were introduced in Congress. The bill which became the
Hinshaw amendment was reported favorably after committee hear-
ings at which witnesses evidenced growing concern with the spread
of FPC jurisdiction at the expense of state regulation. 1 '
The Committee report attending the bill in the House stressed that
the amendment "reaffirms and is thoroughly consistent with the origi-
nal intent of the Congress in enacting the Natural Gas Act; namely,
that the act was to supplement and not supplant state regulation."162
The purpose of the amendment was explained in these terms:
[T]he Commission has undertaken regulation of some activities of cer-
tain companies engaged in the distribution of natural gas whose operations
take place wholly within a single state and which can be completely
regulated by the respective States. This has resulted in unnecessary dupli-
cation of State and Federal jurisdiction, and has caused extra expense to
individual companies because of overlapping requirements regarding the
filing of reports and information. This bill eliminates this duplication by
leaving the jurisdiction over these companies exclusively in the States,
as always has been intended.16 3
In addition, floor debate in both the House and Senate demonstrated
the reaction of Congress to the Court's decision in East Ohio. For
example, Senator Bricker said:
The Congress regarded then [1938], as I am sure it still does, the pur-
chase, transmission, and sale of natural gas for ultimate use within a
State as local matters. The Congress believed that all aspects of such
transactions should be regulated locally by State regulatory bodies, which
were better acquainted with local needs and the activities of local com-
panies.' 
4
And, he stated further: "The Court did not give consideration to
the actual intent of Congress. Such intent would have been very
simple for the Court to have found, if it had attempted to examine
the debates which were held upon the floor of the Senate and the floor
of the House at the time the Natural Gas Act was passed."' 65
Despite all this, however, an attorney examining the Hinshaw
160 Hearings on H.R. 5976 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1953).
161 Id. at 45, 52.
162H.R. Rep. No. 899, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1953), adopted without change, S. Rep.
No. 817, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1953).1 63 Id. at 2.
164 100 Cong. Rec. 3169 (1954).
165 Id. at 3169-70.
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amendment in light of Supreme Court's East Ohio decision, must treat
it as a congressional cession of power to the states, 6 ' involving an
aspect of the regulation of commerce which the Court previously had
categorized as belonging exclusively within federal control. As such,
a strict interpretation of the amendment is to be anticipated. Only
those natural gas companies able to bring themselves squarely within
its terms will be exempted.
The amendment provides:
The provisions of this Act shall not apply to any person engaged in or
legally authorized to engage in the transportation in interstate commerce
or the sale in interstate commerce for resale, of natural gas received by
such person from another person within or at the boundary of a State if
all the natural gas so received is ultimately consumed within such State,
or to any facilities used by such person for such transportation or sale,
provided that the rates and service of such person and facilities be subject
to regulation by a State commission. The matters exempted from the pro-
visions of this Act by this subsection are declared to be matters primarily
of local concern and subject to regulation by the several states. A certifi-
cation from such State Commission to the Federal Power Commission
that such State commission has regulatory jurisdiction over rates and ser-
vice of such person and facilities and is exercising such jurisdiction shall
constitute conclusive evidence of such regulatory power or jurisdic-
tion.117
Thus, to qualify for the amendment's exemption, delivery to the
intrastate pipeline must be at the boundary of or within the state
where all the gas so delivered will be consumed. 6 ' A delivery, even a
short distance outside the state, would be fatal, and instead of a
Hinshaw exemption one would have an undoubted jurisdictional
situation. 6 '
While it is arguable from the language of the amendment that in
order to be exempted such activities need be only subject to state
regulation, not actually regulated, recourse to the floor debates and
the contemporary words of Representative Hinshaw make such an
166 See infra, § VIII.
167 Natural Gas Act § 1(c), 68 Stat. 36 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (1958).
168 In Hearings on H.R. 5976 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1953), the question was raised as to
whether gas received from an interstate line a few thousand yards outside the state boundary
would fall within the exemption. The General Counsel of the FPC suggested to the subcom-
mittee that if such companies were to be exempted by the amendment, the phrase "or ap-
proximately at the border of a state" should be added. In light of this emphasis on the amend-
ment's language, and subsequent failure by Congress to change the wording, a liberal con-
struction for companies so situated seems impossible.
169 There would be no basis for distinguishing the preemptive holding of FPC v. Southern
Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964), involving parallel provisions of the Federal Power Act
in such case. Even if there were, FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950), would
place the activity in an exclusive federal jurisdiction area subject to the Natural Gas Act.
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interpretation unlikely."" Nor does the FPC accept any such inter-
pretation. It takes the position that a state commission must be pres-
ently exercising regulatory authority, demonstrated by the state com-
mission's certificate to that effect filed with the FPC, before the exemp-
tion will be granted. 1 ' In light of the amendment's wording and
legislative history, it is predictable that the FPC interpretation will
prevail.
It is unproductive to inquire into what constitutes effective state
regulation in these Hinshaw situations. State commissions can issue
certificates that insure exemption. If a state commission issues a
certificate, it is by law conclusive upon the FPC regardless of the
actual effectiveness of the underlying state regulatory system. If a
state commission is not willing to issue the certificate, one can be cer-
tain the FPC will refuse to find effective state regulation,' and its
finding on such a record will prove unassailable.
From 1954, when the amendment was passed, through 1963 the
FPC had issued 131 Hinshaw exemptions. 7 Inquiry reveals all are
based on state certificates of exemption.
The Hinshaw amendment arose from a decision adverse to state
regulatory powers where gas from a foreign state entered a consum-
ing state. Situations also can arise in which gas is produced and trans-
ported solely within the same state through the medium of a juris-
dictional interstate pipeline that acquired the gas on a jurisdictional
basis. Even though one assumes that such in-state gas in the hands of
such a deliverer is subject to the jurisdiction of the FPC,11' both the
literal application and the spirit of the Hinshaw amendment should
exempt a "Hinshaw" purchaser from FPC regulation of his further
in-state main line transmissions and sales for resale beyond the point
of the FPC-regulated sale to him. It would be gas delivered within a
state to be consumed within the state, and that, together with meeting
the formalities of the FPC's exempting procedure, is all the law
requires.
In dealing with Hinshaw exemptions one always must carefully
remember that the sale to the exempted transporter-reseller or trans-
porter-distributor is jurisdictional with the FPC. It is only that pur-
170 "Mr. Smith: I want to find out about the effect of regulation that would be applied
under this bill ... in states where there is no State regulatory body or where there is no effec-
tive State regulation.
"Mr. Hinshaw: When there is no effective regulation it [the transporter] would be subject to
the Federal Power Commission." 99 Cong. Rec. 10563 (1953).
171 IS C.F.R. §§ 152. 1-152.4 (1961).
172 Ibid.
178 F.P.C., 1963 Annual Report 132.
174 It is the conclusion of the writers that such gas is within the jurisdiction of the FPC.
See, infra, § VII B dealing with the Florida Parishes case.
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chaser's subsequent transmissions and distributions or sales for resale
that are made non-jurisdictional by the amendment.
VI. THE THRUST TO EXPAND FEDERAL
POWER COMMISSION CONTROLS
The reason for the consistent drive to expand the coverage of the
Natural Gas Act is not difficult to comprehend. It was ably revealed
by Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent in the East Ohio Gas Co. case:
I can well understand the zeal of the Federal Power Commission to ex-
pand its control over the natural gas industry. It sprawls over many
states .... Its regulation cannot be uniform if the Federal Power Com-
mission controls only a middle segment, with production on one end and
distribution on the other committed to the control of different states ....
This obviously subdivides regulation of what has to operate as a unitary
enterprise .... 175
The pattern of encroachment developed in previous portions of this
article makes it evident enough that the urge to approach unitary
control has not subsided but rather has accelerated since this 1950
observation. At this point the writers will undertake to examine cer-
tain especially sensitive areas where controversy as to the powers of
the FPC either presently exists or may arise.
A. FPC Legislative Program
Whether or not one agrees with the jurisdiction sought, the FPC is
to be applauded when it openly seeks specific legislative authority to
expand its jurisdiction. At the same time, the legislation sought is
revealing of the role the Commission seeks for itself, and the disposi-
tion of certain issues where legislation once was sought also reveals
that the FPC is unwilling to confine itself to the route of petitioning
Congress for increased powers.
Analysis of the FPC's legislative requests from its 1954 Annual
Report through its latest 1963 Annual Report discloses the familiar
pattern of a federal regulatory agency striving to expand its jurisdic-
tion. Though unlikely ever squarely to admit it (it comes close on
occasion) ,176 it is evident from the totality of its decisions, the stance
it assumes in court cases, and its legislative requests that the FPC
regards all natural gas rates prior to exempt local distribution not
subject to its control as a threat to the overall rate structure it seeks
to construct and maintain.
At the close of the 88th session of Congress in 1964, the following
17 FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 488 (1950).
176 Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 26 F.P.C. 606, 613 (1961).
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requests, among others, by the FPC were outstanding. Not one was
enacted, and undoubtedly most will be revived.
1. Authority to prescribe safety regulations with respect to the
construction and operation of interstate pipelines. 7' Such regula-
tory powers, if granted, might be preemptive and oust state
regulation, though the effect realistically to be anticipated in so
sensitive an area of the local police power's responsibility for
public safety would be non-preemptive concurrent regulation,
with the federal standards treated as minimums and the individ-
ual states permitted to promulgate more stringent regulations to
the extent these did not become unduly burdensome upon
commerce.1
7 8
2. Authority to approve securities issues of interstate natural gas
pipelines.'
3. Authority to order interconnections of jurisdictional facilities,
and the terms, arrangements and conditions for emergency sale
or exchange of gas through such interconnections in jurisdic-
tional situations. The same arrangement is sought on a voluntary
basis where jurisdiction does not exist, with a jurisdictional exemp-
tion so the voluntarily cooperating non-jurisdictional supplier
does not become subject to FPC jurisdiction by reason of sup-
plying gas into jurisdictional lines.' FPC behavior to date does
not inspire confidence that the voluntary cooperation exemption
would be maintained.' By interpretation or a further legislative
request it is quite predictable that a time would come when this
Commission would attempt to sweep the voluntary suppliers into
jurisdictional status.
4. Comprehensive investigative authority over all facets of the nat-
ural gas industry, whether or not subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission. 8 2
177 No bills have been submitted in support of this request. In the series of footnotes fol-
lowing, the FPC requests for legislation may have existed prior to 1954, but annual reports
before that date were not checked.
178 See supra, note 77.
L79 This request is embodied in H.R. 6790 and S. 1826, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963). It
has been carried in all annual FPC reports from 1954 through 1963. See also S. 1700, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) seeking to authorize the Commission to control security issues de-
signed to finance the construction, acquisition or operation of pipeline facilities for which a
certificate of public convenience and security is needed from the Commission.,
180 This request, similar in content to what already is contained in the Federal Power Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 824(c) and (d), is embodied in H.R. 7586 and S. 1843, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963). It has been carried in all annual FPC reports from 1954 through 1963. At present
the Commission, by regulation, excepts emergency sales and transportation by an independent
producer if limited to a duration of less than 60 days. 18 C.F.R. § 157.29 (1961).
181 See supra, note 103.
182 This request, similar in content to what already is contained in the Federal Power Act,
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5. Authority to regulate importation and exportation of natural gas
with foreign nations, to the extent these operations are located in
the United States, on the same basis as domestic natural gas,
instead of the present authority merely to authorize or refuse to
authorize imports and exports. 8 Also to be noted is the Com-
mission's press release of January 14, 1963, giving notice that the
FPC is considering claiming jurisdiction over the import and
export of liquefied natural gas equal to the jurisdiction it has or
obtains over pipeline gas in foreign commerce.
6. Sole authority to pass upon acquisitions of jurisdictional natural
gas pipeline companies and their assets to the exclusion of the
regular antitrust laws." 4 This request is an effort to overcome
the effects of California v. FPC,"8 ' where a merger between juris-
dictional pipelines was held subject to the general antitrust laws
in addition to FPC regulatory approval.
7. Authority to require FPC approval of alienation of gas reserves
owned by an interstate pipeline company. 8 The request ap-
parently originates in an effort to overcome the 1949 decision of
FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.,87 permitting a juris-
dictional interstate pipeline company to spin off producing prop-
erties into a non-jurisdictional producing company without the
FPC having jurisdiction over the transaction.
Unlike the legal situation at the time of the Panhandle case,
when production was not yet treated as per se jurisdictional from
the ratemaking standpoint (though if owned by a pipeline it
had to be evaluated on some basis in order to include it as an ele-
ment in jurisdictional sales off the line), it is now established that
there is direct ratemaking jurisdiction of any production which
goes into an interstate pipeline for resale, and the gas reserves
which support such jurisdictional service are treated as dedicated
to that service, absent FPC permitted abandonment.' 88 Quite
16 U.S.C. § 825(g) (1958), is embodied in H.R. 5867 and S. 1463, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
1963. It has been carried in all annual FPC reports from 1954 through 1963, and was the
subject of comment in 1963 specially urging passage.
183 This request is embodied in H.R. 7286 and S. 1844, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963). It
has been carried in all annual FPC reports from 1954 through 1963. Natural Gas Act §
3, 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717b (1958) states the present authority of the FPC.
184 This request was first made in the 1961 report and was carried from the 1962 report
into the 1963 report by reference.
185 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
186 This request is embodied in H.R. 7587 and S. 1845, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). It
has been carried in all annual FPC reports from 1954 through 1963.
187 337 U.S. 498 (1949).
188 Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 170 (1960); Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC,
364 U.S. 137 (1960). The FPC almost never has permitted certification on a basis less than
the life of the reserve represented.
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clearly a transfer of reserves so dedicated must remain dedicated
in the hands of a purchaser-successor as well as the owner under
which the dedication took place. In situations where independent
producers acquire dedicated reserves as successors to the company
originally certificated, the FPC has developed procedures requiring
the successor to be certificated by it. 9' Although untested, it is
probable that the conditioning power inherent in the certificating
process could be used to prevent any rate increase which might
be demanded by the successor but could not have been obtained
by the predecessor. 9 °
This FPC successor-certificating procedure would seem to
apply equally to both independent producer conveyances to
independent producer successors and pipeline producer convey-
ances to independent producer successors. Thus far it is has been
applied only in the former situation, but the FPC attitude re-
garding the ratemaking consequences which would flow from
the latter situation is fairly well disclosed by some of its recent
proceedings.
In a 1962 case'.' a pipeline company proposed to convey both
on-system and off-system reserves to an affiliated producing
company which thereafter would continue, as an independent
producer, to deliver the on-system reserves to the pipeline for
jurisdictional service. Because of FPC staff objections these mat-
ters were settled on the basis that on-system reserves were not
conveyed but remained in the ownership of the pipeline company,
and only the off-system reserves were transferred.
In 1964 the FPC decided, in notably broad and uncompro-
mising terms, that deliveries to a jurisdictional pipeline company
from its subsidiary producing company should be subject to cost
of service-rate base ratemaking, as if produced by the pipeline
company itself."9 2 The reverse of this situation, where the juris-
dictional pipeline company is in a subordinate or affiliated sister
company relationship with the producing company, is presently
in litigation on the issue of whether independent producer or
pipeline ratemaking methods shall rule the rates there to be per-
mitted."9 3 Given the very broad ratemaking standards accorded
the Commission by the Court..4 and acknowledging that both
189 18 C.F.R. § 157.24(d) (2) (1961). See Graridge Corp., 30 F.P.C. 1158 (1963).
190 Cf. 30 F.P.C. at 1165.
191 Tenneco Corp., 28 F.P.C. 382 (1962).
192 Union Producing Co., 31 F.P.C. 41 (1964).
108 Cities Serv. Gas Co., Docket No. RP 64-97.
194 Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 309 (1963).
[Vol. 19:448
THE NATURAL GAS ACT EXPERIENCE
of these situations are fully-jurisdictional gas deliveries with only
the ratemaking method in issue, in the opinion of the writers
there appears little likelihood of overturning the FPC in whatever
ratemaking method it chooses, provided the method chosen does
not yield unreasonable or confiscatory results.'95 Indeed, even as
to off-system sales by jurisdictional pipeline producers, which
sales are jurisdictional because ending in the jurisdictional service
of another pipeline company it is unlikely the Commission must
accord such sales independent producer ratemaking treatment,
though to date it has done so both in the hands of pipeline pro-
ducers and of successors to whom such reserves have been sold.
Thus, it appears the FPC does not absolutely need legislation
authorizing it to control alienations of pipeline-owned reserves
dedicated to jurisdictional service in order to control rates in the
hands of successors at a lower level than those to which the suc-
cessor normally would be entitled. On the other hand, the admin-
istrative complications are formidable if control in this manner
is the only device available. It is perhaps to avoid such compli-
cations, which will arise if pipelines are permitted freely to make
these transfers, that the FPC maintains this legislative request,
intending, if it gets the power, to prevent the pipelines from
making any conveyances of dedicated reserves save in exceptional
situations acceptable to it.
One can be quite certain that by its request the Commission
does not mean to control the conveyances of pipeline-owned re-
serves which never have become dedicated to jurisdictional ser-
vice. But even if this be true, the problem of measuring the
extent of pipeline-owned reserves which have become dedicated
to jurisdictional service promises immense difficulties. 9 "
195 The broad ratemaking standards of FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944) would make it most difficult to defeat such a result. This would not be a case of
separating non-jurisdictional from jurisdictional activities, a matter which must be approached
with more precision. See Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 337 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964), where an
FPC attempt to claim the advantage for ratemaking purposes of losses in non-jurisdictional
activities incorporated in a consolidated income tax return with jurisdictional revenues was
rebuffed, the court noting that ratemaking discretion is broad, but not so broad as to permit
reduction of rates with wholly non-jurisdictional tax benefits.
198 The dedication of reserves by an independent producer is readily enough identified in
terms of the properties described in the gas sales contract with a pipeline, but where it is the
pipeline's own reserves there is no contract. Suppose a jurisdictional pipeline owned reserves
in an area from which it was taking gas into its own system equal to a 100-year supply.
Certainly the wells connected to its pipeline and the drilling and spacing unit acreage occupied
by produ/cing wells (or practical equivalent in a state not setting drilling and spacing units)
should be dedicated. Beyond this, reserve acreage in the area equivalent to the deliverability
through time required by the FPC in producer contracts filed as rate schedules might be held
dedicated. But it would be confiscatory to require unduly large dedications of reserves simply
because they are owned by the pipeline in the immediate area. Discounted present worth is the
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8. Authority to regulate direct industrial consumer sales in addition
to presently-regulated sales for resale.197 At the present time
there exists indirect authority to prevent such sales through exer-
cise of the certificating power pursuant to FPC v. Transconti-
nental Gas Pipeline Corp.,19 but this is not so efficient as would
be direct regulation. This case and this legislative request well
demonstrate the FPC's concern with the price effects of sales
which it cannot regulate upon the rates allowed in jurisdictional
sales.
From 1956 through 1960 the Commission sought legislative ap-
proval for abandonment of the traditional cost of service-rate base
methods of ratemaking. Presumably this has been dropped because of
numerous cases supporting broad discretionary powers in selecting
ratemaking methods, culminating in the Supreme Court's 1963 dic-
tum in Wisconsin v. FPC.155 In that case, the Court encouraged and
tentatively approved the area rate scheme by which producer rates
will be determined and scheduled on an industry basis for all indepen-
dent producers in large geographic areas instead of in terms of the
revenue needs of individual producers." 0
From 1956 through 1960 the Commission sought legislative
authority to increase rates without the purchaser's consent. This al-
ways has been possible in the open-end rate filings typical of inter-
state pipeline companies' sales to local distributors. In the contractual
rate filings which typify independent producer-pipeline purchaser sales
arrangements it is well established that contract prices can be reduced.
As to rate increases above contract prices, the Commission has some
real value of any oil and gas property, and that value could be largely destroyed if excessive
reserves were required to be committed as measured against the daily service delivery volumes
being taken into the pipeline's own system .
197 This request is embodied in H.R. 7117 and S. 1734, 88th Congress, 1st Sess. (1963).
It has been carried in all annual FPC reports since 1961, and in the 1963 report was the subject
of comment specially urging passage.
198 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
199 373 U.S. 294, 308-10 (1963).
2o0 For an able discussion of the area rate scheme and the legal difficulties it will generate,
see Ross, The Area Rate Proceedings: An Unsettled Experiment in Public Control of Natural
Gas Prices, 18 Sw. L.J. 165 (1964). The writers of this article do not believe the area rate
method can bear legal analysis in terms of the "just and reasonable" rate standards for the
individual company contemplated by the Natural Gas Act. It will produce windfalls for a few
and virtual confiscation for others. Nevertheless the writers anticipate that the Supreme Court
will uphold it when the test case arrives, for this is about the only way to clamp a lid back on
the Pandora's box the Court opened in 1954, when it held producers and gatherers subject to
rate regulation under the Natural Gas Act. That error logically compels development of an
expeditious ratemaking device by the Commission and the Court when the statute itself pro-
vides none, even though it results in conventional cost of service-rate base ratemaking under
which neither confiscation nor windfalls will be possible in the case of jurisdictional pipelines
but revenue consequences in relation to costs for independent producers subject to area rates
so haphazard it is difficult to conceive of them as utility ratemakings.
THE NATURAL GAS ACT EXPERIENCE
power under FPC v. Sierra Power Co.,2"' where, in the analagous
Federal Power Act area, the Supreme Court suggested that rates might
be increased over contract prices if they were so low as to affect the
public interest adversely by casting an excessive and discriminatory
burden on other consumers. Very likely in ceasing to make this request
the FPC has concluded that this power, along with application of area
rates to independent producers, will eliminate, in a fairly expeditious
manner, rates deemed too low.
Through 1961 the Commission sought power to suspend rate sched-
ules of interstate pipeline companies in sales for resale to industrial
users just as in other sales subject to the Natural Gas Act. In 1962
section 4(e) of the act was amended to give it this power.2"2
From 1956 through 1960 the Commission sought legislation autho-
rizing it to eliminate indefinite price escalation clauses in independent
producer contracts filed as rate schedules. Unwilling to acquiesce in
failure to obtain such legislation, the Commission, by its Order No.
242,02 attained through rulemaking the result it had sought through
legislation.
B. Rulemaking Powers
That the rulemaking power of the FPC under Section 16 of the
Natural Gas Act 20 4 is a remarkably potent weapon is demonstrated by
FPC v. Texaco, Inc.2"' Despite previous declarations that contractual
arrangements between producer and pipeline purchaser were within
the sole discretion of the parties,0 0 the Supreme Court upheld FPC
Order No. 242 to the effect that, after April 3, 1962, the Commission
would refuse to accept for filing as rate schedules any contracts exe-
cuted on or after that date which contained provisions other than
those for increased tax reimbursement, price increases to specified
amounts at definite dates, and once-in-five-year price redeterminations.
Banned by the regulation were "most favored nation" clauses designed
to match prices with those obtained by other sellers under subse-
quently-negotiated contracts, spiral escalation clauses tied to increased
201 350 U.S. 348 (1956). See also dictum in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas
Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956), a Natural Gas Act case. In Gulf Oil Corp., Docket No.
9-9520 an FPC examiner, after conducting an overall rate review under § 5a of the Natural
Gas Act, ordered Gulf to file new rates revised upward as well as downward, as necessary,
to eliminate extreme disparities in individual sales, even though the upward adjustments ex-
ceeded contract prices. Whether this properly falls within the Sierra principle is unlitigated
to date, as the case was settled.
202 52 Star. 823 (1938), as amended, 76 Stat. 72 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1958).
20218 C.F.R. § 154.93 (1961).
204 52 Star. 830 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 7170 (1958).
205 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
206 Supra, note 144.
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prices obtained by purchasers of gas, and any other indefinite pricing
clauses not permitted under the rule. The basis of this decision can
only be administrative convenience, for while such clauses provide the
opportunity to seek rate increases in a manner that is frequent and
unpredictable, rate increases can be obtained only to the extent that
the just and reasonable standards of the Natural Gas Act, as adminis-
tered by the FPC, are met. The Supreme Court's decision means the
Commission's power to legislate interstitially by rulemaking is so
great that even an acknowledged substantive legal right freely to con-
tract can be set aside where deemed administratively expedient.
Further evidence that the Court will accord broad rulemaking
powers is found in the FPC v. H. L. Hunt' 7 opinion which actively
encourages the Commission to refuse to take jurisdiction of what it
deems to be inconsequential cases. If such a rule comes to pass, pro-
ducer sales contracts which the Congress believed it lacked power to
regulate will be preempted for rate regulation purposes by a law which
had no preemptive purpose. Then some persons affected by the regula-
tion thus imposed will be ousted from jurisdictional recourse before
the only tribunal authorized to hear them. That what the Court holds
to be a rate-regulated utility relationship can be relieved of active
regulation for reasons of administrative convenience is a difficult idea
to grasp.
Another rulemaking, Order No. 243,20 redefined "independent
producer" from a producer not primarily engaged in the operations of
an interstate pipeline to one not engaged in the transportation of
natural gas in interstate commerce other than as a gatherer. The effect
is to narrow the group enjoying what is usually a rate advantage now
accorded independent producers and to enlarge the interstate pipeline
group subject to relatively low returns by reason of the cost of service-
rate base conventional utility ratemaking methods yet applied to
them.2"' It is conceivable that pipeline producers could be denied the
advantages of independent producer status as to their production not
taken into their own pipeline systems but sold to other pipelines on a
jurisdictional basis for resale.210 At the present time proceedings are in
progress to determine whether a gas sale by an oil company to its
affiliated jurisdictional gas company shall be accorded independent
207 376 U.S. 515, 527 (1964).
208 18 C.F.R. § 154.91 (a) (1961).
209 See DeCrane, Federal Power Commssion: Regulatory Evolution At the Ten Year Mark,
15th Oil & Gas Inst. 271 (Sw. Legal Foundation 1964); Rather, Pipeline and Producer
Problems Relating to Pipeline Owned Reserves - With Particular Reference to Recent
Federal Power Commission Regulation, 1964 Proceedings, ABA Section of Mineral and Natural
Resources Law 43.
210 See supra, note 195.
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producer rate status or cost of service pipeline status."' In the reverse
situation of deliveries to a jurisdictional pipeline company from its
subsidiary producing company, cost of service-rate base pipeline rate-
making was imposed."'
Docket No. R-199 is a proposed rulemaking designed to restrict the
terms of "take or pay" provisions which can be inserted in a contract
filed as a rate schedule. Docket No. R-200 is a proposed rulemaking to
provide standards for pipeline quality gas, with downward price ad-
justments for gas of deficient B.T.U. content but no upward adjust-
ments for gas of superior content. On parity of reasoning with the
now-established legality of rejecting indefinite pricing clauses, it is
predictable that a reasonable "take or pay" restriction also will be up-
held. However, the failure to give upward adjustments for gas of
superior B.T.U. rating seems an arbitrary discrimination. Natural gas
is chiefly valuable for its heat content, and it is quite obvious that any
purchaser willing to pay a B.T.U. premium is able, or expects shortly
to become able, to so blend gas as to produce an overall line flow at or
near minimum requirements. Certainly the purchaser or his customers
should not have a windfall by purchasing gas of superior quality for
less than it is worth to them.
These rulemakings are rationalized by pointing out that an appli-
cant adversely affected by the rule can apply for an exception."' Of
course such applications necessarily must prove exercises in futility. If
not, the rule would be ineffective to accomplish its intended purpose.
C. FPC Treatment Of Income Tax Depletion Allowances,
Depreciation Deferrals And Investment Credits
Though without any implications to the federal-state regulatory
relationship, the behavior of the FPC in the income tax area merits
close attention because of the treatment it has accorded tax concessions
granted by Congress.
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. FPC 4 it was held that tax savings
resulting from the percentage depletion allowance, designed by Con-
gress to restore the capital attrition which occurs when a wasting
natural resource is produced, could not be retained by gas producers
in jurisdictional service situations but had to be flowed through to
purchasers for the ultimate benefit of consumers. The rule is no longer
of importance to independent producers since abandonment of cost
2" Supra, note 193.
212 Supra, note 192.
2"FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); 18 C.F.R. § 1.7(b) (1961).
214281 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 912 (1961).
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of service ratemaking as to them,21 but it continues to affect interstate
pipeline producers subject to this ratemaking method.21" The depletion
allowance may or may not be overgenerous, a widely disputed point,
but to take from any category of wasting natural resource producers
the capital restoration allowed them, in the absence of a positive con-
gressional indication they are to be singled out, treated differently
from other taxpayers, and denied capital restoration, seems the least
likely interpretation to put on the law. It is, however, typical of cur-
rent FPC attitudes concerning tax advantages provided in the income
tax statutes.
In 1954 Congress provided the business community with an option
to depreciate qualifying properties by either straight line or accelerated
methods. 17 Accelerated methods are designed to give greater deprecia-
tion early in the life of an investment, at the expense of later annual
depreciations. Total depreciation does not vary, but in the case of an
expanding operation the overall impact can be deferred so long as ex-
pansion is rapid enough. For obvious reasons it was to the advantage
of many companies in the expanding natural gas industry to choose
accelerated depreciation.
Where accelerated depreciation was used, the FPC, following prin-
ciples developed in 1953 involving the amortization of emergency
facilities,1 s first permitted an accounting procedure known as "nor-
malization." This allows income taxes to be computed on a straight
line basis for ratemaking purposes even though actual tax liability is
less because computed by one of the accelerated methods. Through
normalization a special fund is accumulated, charged with the burden
of the deferred future tax liability. At first the FPC included this
reserve fund in the rate base and allowed it the same rate of return as
other assets.21
In City of Detroit v. FPC21° the court approved normalization in
relation to emergency facilities. This approval of normalization was
carried by the FPC into subsequent cases dealing with ordinary ac-
celerated depreciation. 2' As late as 1960 the FPC permitted normaliza-
tion and a full rate of return on the resulting reserve fund.22'
215 Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960).
21' Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 305 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 916 (1963).217 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(b).
218 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 168. This provision first was placed in the Code to meet
industry needs in relation to industrial expansion in the World War II period. Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 124. See Treatment of Federal Income Taxes as Affected by Accelerated Amortiza-
tion, 12 F.P.C. 369 (1953).
219 Amere Gas Utility Co., 15 F.P.C. 760 (1956).
220230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
221 See City of Lexington v. FPC, 295 F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1961).
222 Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960).
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In 1961 the FPC altered its position. While not preventing a natural
gas company from using accelerated depreciation for income tax pur-
poses, the FPC may reduce benefits or deny them entirely by refusing
to allow a full rate of return on the reserve fund. Thus, the FPC re-
duced the rate of return that would be allowed on the reserve fund to
one and one-half per cent, regardless of the rate allowed on the re-
mainder of the rate base.2 This reduction was upheld by a sharply
divided court sitting en banc in Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v.
FPC..4 on the theory that the congressional intent behind accelerated
depreciation was to provide investment incentive and, with other ad-
vantages, a one and one-half percent return was sufficient incentive.
Although the court correctly stated the purpose of the depreciation
allowance, its upholding the one and one-half percent limit was a com-
plete non sequitur.
A strong argument can be made that this step was pure defiance of
Congress. It amounts pro tanto to denial of the tax advantage intended
by Congress to draw a distinction between the rate that is allowed on
capital investment depreciated on a straight-line basis and the reserve
fund which is its economic equivalent. The dissent in this case is a
masterful revelation of how a general congressional enactment can be
manipulated to bring about a conclusion opposite to that which nor-
mally would follow, by charging Congress with failure to specify in its
statute how a particular class of taxpayers should be treated.225
The FPC went even further, however, and, in its 1964 decision of
Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co.,22" completely reversed its original
position. It not only refused to allow any return whatsoever on the
accumulated reserve but abolished normalization. Henceforth, cost
of service can include only the amount of income tax actually paid.
Obviously the FPC was persuaded that a taxpayer able to defer the
impact of the eventual higher rates associated with accelerated depre-
ciation through continued expansion should not enjoy the advantages
of normalization in any situation subject to its jurisdiction, even
though all other taxpayers continue to enjoy the concession in full.
223 Northern Natural Gas Co., 25 F.P.C. 431 (1961).
224 316 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 881 (1963).
225 Id. at 663-74. "The majority err.., and go beyond their province when they say the
sections [of the Internal Revenue Code], though general in language, do not apply literally to
regulated companies because their language and legislative history do not show Congress con-
sidered their 'regulatory consequences.' . . . This amounts to saying that Congress made a
mistake .. . and that the Commission and this court have the right to amend the section in
accord with their 'economic and regulatory philosophy. ' " Id. at 673.
226-F.P.C.- (1964), Opinion No. 417. Since the contrary 1961 decision of Northern
Natural Gas Co., 25 F.P.C. 760 (1956), FPC membership has changed completely. See Note,
Liberalized Depreciation: About-Face By the FPC, 50 Va. L. Rev. 298, 299 (1964).
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The Commission noted that Congress had not specifically directed
where the tax advantage was to go in regulated industries. This is
hardly a remarkable omission from a general tax law applicable to the
totality of millions of American businesses.227 And, while the majority
is correct in stating that its duty under the Natural Gas Act is to
insure the lowest reasonable rates, accelerated depreciation was intended
by Congress to benefit the entire business community. It is a part of
the Internal Revenue Code, not the Natural Gas Act. The FPC seems
to have placed the intent of Congress expressed in the Natural Gas Act
over the later expressed intent of Congress concerning accelerated
depreciation for all businesses. Two separate congressional pronounce-
ments are involved. Absent a clear indication that Congress intended
to single out certain businesses for discriminatory treatment, the later
law should modify, not be modified by the earlier. 28
That the congressional purpose was thwarted is indicated by the
treatment accorded the importunings of FPC Chairman Swidler
when he sought to persuade Congress to remove a specific provision
from the Revenue Act of 1964 directing regulatory agencies to allow
jurisdictional companies to retain the savings from the investment
tax credit22. that was introduced in the Revenue Act of 1962. The
provision was inserted because of FPC and court behavior in regard to
accelerated depreciation. The position of the FPC was that these
savings, too, should be "flowed through" to the customers of the
jurisdictional natural gas companies. Congress refused to eliminate
the provision, and it appears in the Revenue Act of 1964 as section
203 (e). 2"'
There is no congressional directive as to what rate of return is to be
allowed on the investment tax credits that companies choose to retain.
Since these are permanent tax savings, there is no reason for them to
appear in an earmarked reserve fund. Neither is there any reason why
a full rate of return should not be allowed on the funds if retained.
Very plainly, by enacting section 203 (e), Congress indicated that the
FPC should not again thwart the operation of its general tax laws.
227 Supra, note 225.
228 Ibid.
229 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 38, 46.
23O Hearings on H.R. 8363 Before Senate Finance Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1797-1801 (1963). In seeking to avoid a congressional prohibition of flow-through treatment
for the investment tax credit, Chairman Swidler said that both with respect to the merits of
the position and with respect to its precedent as destructive of the administrative process the
Congress should not specify the tax treatment. Id. at 1801. For a Commission that purported
to find authority in these tax situations in the failure of Congress to specify the treatment
intended supra, note 225, it truly gives the game away to take this position. It amounts to an
assertion to Congress that the administrative process in fact includes the power to legislate,
from which Congress is invited to stand aside and let the Commission control.
231 Pub. L. No. 88-272, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 203 (e) (Feb. 26, 1964).
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Were the FPC disposed to be concerned with the intent of Congress,
it, or the courts for it, should reconsider the position that has been
taken in these tax matters. Instead, the FPC response to the implica-
tions of section 203 (e) was the sweeping decision of Alabama-Ten-
nessee Natural Gas Co., s22 entirely eliminating the benefits of accele-
rated depreciation. Beyond this, there now are indications that the
FPC proposes to compel jurisdictional interstate pipelines to "choose"
accelerated depreciation so there always will be maximum tax deferrals
to flow through.'
D. Refund Jurisdiction
A refunding obligation upon jurisdictional natural gas companies
may arise from a permanent initial certification requiring refund of
a portion of the rates collected in the temporary initial certification
period, collections under bond after the suspension period in the case
of requested rate increases, 235 or agreements involving either of these
types of proceedings settled without final adjudication, on terms agree-
able to the FPC and other interested parties." Additionally, though
overall review of a jurisdictional company's rates gives rise to no
refund obligation as to past collections, ' continued collections under
court stay orders pending judicial review of an FPC order directing
reduced rates can give rise to a refunding obligation.
It is the view of the FPC that, absent a showing that a particular
company is entitled to keep all or part of a refund by reason of having
absorbed the increase without passing it on, or by reason of other
equity, the refund should be passed along for the benefit of the ulti-
mate consumer. Yet the ultimate service from the purchasing local
232 F.P.C. - (1964), Opinion No. 417. The decision is being extended to all jurisdic-
tional companies, rather than just to the specific companies involved. See Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, Docket No. R-264, 29 Fed. Reg. 9723 (1964). In view of the fact that the
Alabama-Tennessee case had not been reviewed by an appellate court, an industry publication
was moved to say, "As far as we can recall, this is the first time that a federal regulatory
agency had a test case and a rulemaking procedure of the same general subject going at the
same time." Public Util. Fort., July 30, 1964, p. 6.
"'a In Midwestern Gas Transmission Company, - FPC - (1965), Docket No. RP 69-1,
the FPC has raised the issue of whether Midwestern's rates should be based on liberalized depre-
ciation even though straight line depreciation was used. If it so determines, it should prove
a difficult position to justify since it abandons the old rationale, present as late as Alabama-
Tennessee, supra, note 232, of basing rates on taxes actually paid. Further, it will involve
the FPC in a conflict with the congressional intent of § 167 to provide taxpayers with an
option of which depreciation method to use.234 FPC v. H. L. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515 (1964). According to Public Serv. Comm'n v.
FPC, 329 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964), this obligation
can arise even though there is no stated refund condition in the temporary certificate.
2"5Natural Gas Act § 4(e), 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 76 Stat. 72 (1962), 15
U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1958).
"' Hunt Oil Co., 30 F.P.C. 220 (1963); Humble Oil & Refining Co., Docket No. G-9287,
July 8, 1964, 29 Fed. Reg. 9677 (1964).237 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1960).
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distributor who resells to the consumer clearly is outside of FPC
jurisdiction." 8 Lacking that jurisdiction, the FPC thus far has con-
tended itself with controlling refunds as they pass through the chain
of jurisdictional natural gas companies to non-jurisdictional local
distributors, then urging action by the state regulatory commissions
to accomplish the final step." 9
While thus far conceding lack of jurisdiction to effect distribution
to ultimate consumers, the FPC has conducted surveys to ascertain the
extent to which refunds have been passed on to them and has been
sharply critical of the failure of some states to require that these
refunds be flowed through." Its attack has drawn spirited rejoinder.Y
The concern of the FPC that refunds be flowed through to the
ultimate consumer is evident enough. The hazard to state regulation is
that the FPC will attempt to devise means of accomplishing this by
indirect procedures. The attempt, if made, very likely would take the
form of ordering a jurisdictional natural gas company in the chain of
refund to hold the funds, as stakeholder, until the FPC has received
assurances that the disposition to be made by non-jurisdictional com-
panies meets its approval."4 Though its authority so to act could not
be rested on jurisdictional transportation or sale for resale insofar as
concededly non-jurisdictional companies are concerned, a basis of
control is presented in the jurisdictional stakeholder company. Justifi-
cation for implementing indirectly what cannot be done directly
might be found in the purpose of the act, so often stressed in the
Supreme Court's opinions, viz., to insure the protection of ultimate
consumers," a result that always is indirect since by the structure of
the act the FPC is unable directly to regulate local distribution.
The possibility is by no means fanciful. A very close analogy exists
in the Supreme Court's 1961 decision of FPC v. Transcontinental Gas
Pipeline Corporation,'" previously discussed, where the indirect con-
.a Natural Gas Act § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958).
239 In Humble Oil & Refining Co., 30 F.P.C. 220 (1963), the FPC stated that if reports
submitted by jurisdictional companies in the chain indicated "that the refunds will flow
through to ultimate consumers or distribution companies not subject to the Commission's juris-
diction, the Commission will authorize the release of such refund sums by Humble (unless a
State regulatory authority after notification of the sum to be made available to a company
subject to its regulatory jurisdiction asks us to defer releasing the funds until it can deter-
mine their ultimate disposition)." 9 Fed. Reg. at 9679 (1964).
2" Hassett, The FPC is on the March, Public Util., Fort., Oct. 10, 1963, p. 56.
"' The National Association of Railroad and Utility Commissions has been extremely
critical of the FPC in this regard, stating that the FPC has attempted to convey the impres-
sion of impropriety if any refunds are retained by a non-jurisdictional company whereas there
may be full justification for the retention in any particular instance. Id. at 59.
... This would be merely an expanded use of the procedure now followed. Supra, note 239.
"' One of the strongest statements of this constantly recurring theme occurs in Atlantic
Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959).
24 Supra, note 151 and § V A.
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trol of the certificating power over a jurisdictional gas pipeline com-
pany and its facilities was used to prevent a non-jurisdictional direct
consumer sale from a Texas producer to a New York electric utility.
Indeed, the opinion in that case is so replete with Court declarations
of ultimate consumer concern as a justification for the indirect control
there permitted that it practically invites this further step into indirect
refund controls at the expense of present state powers to act, or not act,
as each state sees fit.
For such remaining light as may be thrown on the refund problem,
one must turn to a series of stay order cases involving the disposition of
funds collected pending appellate review of FPC rate reduction orders.
There is no doubt but that such funds are subject to disposition by the
courts in the exercise of their inherent equity powers. The permissible
range of authorized disposition, however, is something else.
In Central States Elec. Co. v. Muscatine,2" the Supreme Court held
the circuit court of appeals, under whose stay order such funds were
collected, without jurisdiction to order payment to ultimate con-
sumers, because the FPC had no jurisdiction under the Natural Gas
Act to have made such an order. This is the dividing line honored by
the FPC is its current refund orders. Beyond this, the Court stated
that the circuit court should hold the fund intact until consumers had
been afforded a reasonable opportunity to litigate their rights to the
fund before state tribunals. 46 However, when disposition was made it
was to be within the limitations of FPC jurisdiction.4
In a subsequent case, FPC v. Interstate Natural Gas Company,24"
this reasoning was extended to include refunds to ultimate consumers
where the distributor was a natural gas company subject to FPC
jurisdiction, as well as a local distributor. By seizing on a jurisdictional
company's fortuitious ownership of non-jurisdictional distribution
facilities to extend the Court's refund powers to a non-jurisdictional
transaction, the case introduces an element of looseness upon which
the Supreme Court might seize to justify indirect control of refunds
by the FPC. The threat is the more serious because there are dissents
in the two cases (the second case making it clear that they are main-
tained dissents) indicating non-acquiescense in the restrictions of the
present rule. Apart from some objection to any limitations upon the
inherent power of a court sitting in equity, dissent is rested on the
purpose of the Natural Gas Act to protect ultimate consumers. The
245 324 U.S. 138 (1945).
248 Id. at 146.
247 Ibid.
248 336 U.S. 577 (1949). See Note, Use of the Refund Device in Rate Regulation, 63
Harv. L. Rev. 1023-1032 (1950).
1965 ]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
dissenters declare that funds not fairly allocable to companies in the
chain of service should be disbursed to consumers."' It would be a
small step indeed to convert such reasoning into justification for the
indirect control of refunds here explored.
E. In-Place Sales Of Reserves
In-place sales of reserves of natural gas already committed to juris-
dictional service under the Natural Gas Act is not the problem here
taken under consideration. The FPC has developed supplemental certi-
ficating procedures whereby the successor assignees of acreage con-
taining such reserves are substituted for the predecessor assignors, as
sellers in the rate schedules filed. True enough there are problems not
yet firmly resolved with regard to refund obligations incurred, or in
process of possibly being incurred, while the property was in the hands
of the assignor, but there is no doubt since about 1954 of general
jurisdictional status.25 The difficulties are difficulties of administrative
accommodation only.
The problem here considered is confined to situations where an
interstate pipeline purchaser proposes to acquire natural gas reserves,
(which usually will be in the property form of oil and gas leases) from
which no jurisdictional sales yet have been made. Though the Supreme
Court has stated that the jurisdictional event is not the contract of
sale but rather the actual commencement of deliveries on a jurisdic-
tional basis," 1 the FPC asserts it has complete jurisdiction over in-place
reserve acquisitions and the parties thereto, just as in ordinary delivery
gas sales contract situations with deliveries in progress. Even though
this position were otherwise sound, it is not apparent how the Com-
mission can have jurisdiction before actual deliveries begin if the in-
place sale is finally consummated before this event occurs. Despite the
fact that it has not thus far succeeded in persuading any court to its
view, the position taken by the Commission has caused the termination
of at least two major in-place sales. 52
The most instructive litigation is the case of Public Serv. Comm'n
v. FPC."5' In proceedings leading up to this case the FPC had acknow-
249 Id.. at 598-600.
25OSupra, notes 188 and 189.
251Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 387-88 (1959). The
FPC has in the past unmistakably taken the same position. Pioneer Gathering System, 23 F.P.C.
260 (1960).
252 Humble-Monterey King Ranch leased sales of reserves approximating six trillion cubic
feet, Docket No. CP62-88, withdrawn May 14, 1963. Pan American - Southwest - El Paso,
San Juan Basin lease sales of reserves, Consolidated Dockets CP63-126, C163-118 and
CI63-1455, withdrawn Sept. 23, 1963.
258 287 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
[Vol. 19:448
THE NATURAL GAS ACT EXPERIENCE
ledged the sale of certain leaseholds to a major interstate pipeline pur-
chaser to be exempt under the Natural Gas Act, but its decision was
challenged on appeal by an intervenor. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the sale by the producer indeed
was non-jurisdictional,"" but held, as to the jurisdictional would-be
pipeline purchaser, that the Commission must either (1) expressly
disclaim any approval of the price paid or (2) establish by evidence
that the price paid would be consistent with the public convenience
and necessity."'
The first of these alternatives really is an impossible one for a utility
purchaser. Unless the in-place acquistion is intended entirely for
non-jurisdictional in-state service (an unusual situation), few juris-
dictional pipeline companies, aware of the hazard, would risk purchas-
ing properties at peril of the values upon which the FPC will permit
taking them into its rate base. The other alternative, and the only
practical one, amounts to effective indirect assertion of jurisdiction
through the certificating power over the jurisdictional purchaser who
is party to the sales transaction. With the ice already broken on the use
of the certificating power to defeat non-jurisdictional sales in the 1961
Transco case,2" ' it is very predictable that this lower court position
will be sustained by the Supreme Court, for here the sale is not even
prevented. It is only controlled by the economic realties of public
utility ratemaking processes.
After remand this case again was appealed, this time to the Fifth
Circuit. That court reversed the FPC, which on remand had changed
its position, claiming general jurisdiction as in other sale of gas for
interstate use. The Fifth Circuits 1964 Marr v. FPC..7 decision is
written to the same effect as the District of Columbia Circuit's in the
first round.
Regardless of the outcome before the Supreme Court, the conclusion
seems inescapable that, for practical purposes, litigating the issue of
general FPC jurisdiction over these sales is largely futile. The reality
is that the FPC's certificating power over would-be interstate pipeline
purchasers of in-place reserves (who must submit to the second alter-
native) is sufficient to control these in detail. Not to be forgotten
either is that the measure within which the FPC imposes its require-
ments when application for approval is made to it is "public conven-
ience and necessity." Given the strong consumer orientation of the
254 Id. at 145.
255 Id. at 146.
256365 U.S. 1 (1961).
257 336 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 958 (1965).
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Supreme Court, the now famous CATCO258 decision demonstrates
that the Court not only will permit but will require such stringent
protection of ultimate consumer interests in any valuations which the
Commission approves that ordinary jurisdictional contracts of sale
will prove the safer and more remumerative device from a business
standpoint.
Despite this reality the actions of the FPC in its handing of the case
on remand are of interest. Instead of following the remand directions
of the Court, the Commission reconsidered the jurisdictional issue.259
Initially it took the position that the seller and purchaser were for-
bidden to make their sale in the form of an in-place sale of reserves,
but subsequently it receded from this stand so that its current stance
is to permit in-place sales of reserves, with both parties to the sales
subject to its jurisdiction.6 °
In essence, the FPC's position is that to free these sales from its
jurisdiction would create a regulatory gap. The 1949 case of FPC v.
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co.,261 where the Supreme Court permitted
an interstate pipeline producer to spin off its producing properties and
thereby prevent the FPC from considering the costs of these properties
when establishing rates of jurisdictional sales, is distinguished because
this situation is the reverse of those facts-an acquisition by a juris-
dictional company, instead of a divestment of its properties. More
pertinently, it was noted that the vitality of Panhandle as a precedent
is doubtful since the 1954 assertion of jurisdiction over producers of
gas dedicated to jurisdictional service. This position is not without
some merit, because on the issue that was litigated in that case
there can be no question but that the 1954 assertion of jurisdiction
effectively overruled its consequences. But nowhere does the FPC come
to grips with the problem of how it gets direct jurisdiction over prop-
erties which are not yet dedicated to jurisdictional service because de-
liveries are not commenced.
The FPC also attempts to demonstrate that in-place sales of reserves
are in reality a subterfuge, amounting, on analysis, to the equivalent
of ordinary contract sales. This argument was emphatically rejected by
the Fifth Circuit in the second appeal.26 All the FPC advanced in
support of its contention was that: (1) this sale covered only certain
horizontally segregated leasehold rights, (2) the sellers reserved a
258 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
259 Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 29 F.P.C. 249 (1963), as modified on rehearing 30
F.P.C. 153 (1963).
260 Ibid.
261 337 U.S. 498 (1949).
262 Marr v. PPC, 336 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 958 (1965).
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production payment under which the notes given covering future in-
stallment payments could be accelerated if future production exceeded
certain volumes, (3) one of the sellers became contract operator for
the buyer, and (4) the purchasing pipeline took the properties through
conveyance from a subsidiary corporation which had acquired them in
the first instance subject to the debt but without any personal liability
(that liability remaining with the assigning subsidiary corporation).
These all are familiar elements of oil and gas property conveyances.
Not one permits the seller, in effect, to reopen and alter the finality of
the trade as made.
If, however, the sale had involved future adjustments of price in
terms of later gas price levels or future recalculations of reserves with
attendant adjustments in price paid or any other element weakening
the finality of the sale, the FPC argument would have more merit.
Here would be a sale not final in acquisition terms when the jurisdic-
tional event of actual deliveries occurred. On such facts it is very likely
the Supreme Court would rule the sale subject to FPC jurisdiction
once deliveries commenced, with the possibility of retroactive adjust-
ment against the sale price because the FPC now would have the basis
for controlling the price ultimately to be paid.
Of course, it must not be overlooked that the Court may simply
hold any such sale made in contemplation of interstate deliveries
jurisdictional, whether or not completed before deliveries are com-
menced. Once policy begins to rule as it has in the Natural Gas Act
area, what seem to be unassailable legal barriers tend to evaporate."'
The dichotomy of non-jurisdictional sale, but effective indirect
control, is further borne out by two 1965 Tenth Circuit cases. In Pan
American Petroleum Corp. v. FPC64 the in-place lease sale was held
non-jurisdictional, citing Marr and Panhandle; but in the companion
case of Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC.65 the pipeline pur-
chaser of the same reserves was held subject to plenary FPC jurisdiction
203 On June 1, 1965, Marr v. FPC, supra, note 262, was decided sub nom. United Gas
Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 1517 (1965). In it the Supreme Court
held inplace sales jurisdictional in what is unmistakably a policy decision designed to flesh out
the jurisdictional control the Court has ordered the FPC to assume. Previous pronouncements to
the effect the event upon which FPC jurisdiction depends is commencement of actual deliveries
are ignored. While it now can be said with certainty that sales of developed reserves destined
for interstate use are jurisdictional, problems remain. How of sales of undeveloped or partially
developed acreage, and how are these to be defined if they are to be treated differently? How
much of the reserve must be predictably destined for interstate transmission before a sale
classifies under the rule of this case? Perhaps the commingling principle of Lo-Vaca, 379 U.S.
366 (1965), will effectively render it impossible for interstate pipeline companies to purchase
non-jurisdictional reserves in place unless the physical system in which the reserve will be used
is a wholly segregated intrastate system in which commingling is impossible.
264 339 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1965).
265 340 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1965).
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in its right to connect the reserves so acquired, and its connection,
without specific authority, was illegal. The power thus shown leads
directly to the effective control by certificating procedures previously
discussed. It also should be noted that the court in Pan American
passed as non-jurisdictional an in-place sale which was subject to
redetermination of reserves in later years, which is to say a sale not
final before jurisdictional deliveries commence. The case thus is weaker
than the Marr case, and will remain a questionable decision even if the
FPC fails in Marr before the Supreme Court.
It may be necessary to measure the terms of in-place sales with some
care to determine if the seller is subject to direct FPC jurisdiction.
When in any case, however, one is met with comprehensive indirect
controls through a certificating power over the purchaser, to which
most purchasers necessarily must submit for economic reasons, the
distinction does not seem greatly important.
F. Gas In Jurisdictional Pipelines
1. The Lo-Vaca Case
Though it took the opposite position until 1960,26 the current
position of the FPC is that where gas not otherwise jurisdictional be-
comes commingled with jurisdictional gas in any segment of an inter-
state line the whole mass is jurisdictional. 2 7 The Commission's position
is simply that because each molecule of gas cannot be perfectly resegre-
gated by origin, inevitably some jurisdictional gas will be delivered to
an otherwise non-jurisdictional use, or vice versa, and that thus its
claim of jurisdiction over the whole mass must be sustained.
This position is fully developed in Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 218 a 1961
266 In City of Hastings v. FPC, 221 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
920 (1955), the FPC successfully supported the position that gas destined for direct munici-
pal power plant fuel use, though commingled with jurisdictional gas sold the same city for
resale to its inhabitants, was non-jurisdictional. There appears to have been no metering into
the line of the two flows. It reiterated that position, again successfully, in State of North
Dakota v. FPC, 247 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1957). Its changed position dates from Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co., 23 F.P.C. 291 (1960), not appealed, where an interstate line originated
in Texas, transited Oklahoma and passed to Kansas. It was proposed to inject Oklahoma gas
into the line with an offtake further north, but still in Oklahoma, which would always
be more than the Oklahoma input. The FPC refused to exempt this transaction, seeking to
distinguish its earlier position in State of North Dakota by claiming the gas in that case was
contractually segregated, an argument it abandoned in Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 26 F.P.C.
606 (1961) when it simply pronounced its earlier position erroneous.
267 Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 26 F.P.C. 606 (1961). The decision states an exception to
this position where the commingling is pursuant to exchange and transportation agreements
for the convenience of transporters. Id. at 611. The categories of gas under discussion actually
are not identified, but local gas commingled with interstate gas must be meant; otherwise,
the comment makes no sense. See Shell Oil Co., 25 F.P.C. 1316 (1961). There is little
reason to believe this exception has any more standing than an indication that the FPC will
not attempt to assert jurisdiction of local gas so commingled at the present time.
268 Ibid.
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FPC proceeding which involves two direct industrial consumer sales
by Texas gatherers of natural gas for use as pipeline compressor fuel
by a major interstate pipeline company. One sale crosses state boun-
daries for use in New Mexico. In the other the gas is consumed in
Texas, where produced. To effect the sale the gas in each instance is
commingled in the purchasing pipeline's Texas-to-California juris-
dictional line with gas undoubtedly jurisdictional. Sale contract
quantities are metered in and out with precision on a basis that the
amount taken off for fuel invariably will exceed the input, thus as-
suring volumentrically, if not molecularly, that no gas sold will pass
beyond the points of consumption. Presumably the additional gas
which provides the excess margin is taken from the general jurisdic-
tional line flow.
In this case the Commission is remarkably frank in disclosing its
motivation to get control of all gas it can to minimize disruption of its
rate structures by uncontrolled competitive sales.26"
The FPC argument was rejected by the Fifth Circuit 7" on the basis
of the large body of case law supporting the separate identity of
mingled fungible commodities which can be resegregated by vol-
umetric measurement in an entirely meaningful economic sense. This
view also drew the support of the Eighth Circuit in two cases,2"' but it
is to be noted that the Eighth Circuit cases involved weaker fact
situations for non-jurisdictional status. This is because in those cases
the claimed non-jurisdictional gas was destined for in-state sale to
local distributors. Because of the varying offtake demand inherent in
such an arangement, perfect precision of inputs and offtakes is not
possible. Inevitably in its combined flow with dump gas destined for
undoubted jurisdictional service, the claimed non-jurisdictional gas
will sometimes exceed the requirements of the local distributors and
pass across state lines, or possibly vice versa with the concededly juris-
dictional gas a cushion on which to draw. Thus, even volumetrically,
either some jurisdictional gas will go to the distributors or claimed non-
jurisdictional gas will go to jurisdictional service insofar as gas in the
line at any given time is concerned. Adjustments necessarily must be
made with an after-the-fact time lag factor instead of the line con-
taining at any given time the precise amount of gas subject to the
claimed non-jurisdictional offtakes.272
269 26 F.P.C. at 613.
2T Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. v. FPC, 323 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1963).
271 State of North Dakota v. FPC, 247 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1957); Amerada Petroleum
Corp. v. FPC, 334 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1964).
272 Cf. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Willmut Gas and Oil Co., 231 Miss. 700, 97 So.
2d 530, 534 (1957).
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Without so much as discussing the body of law relied on by the two
lower courts that have dealt with this problem, in a brief and very
murky opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in the
1965 case of California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. 7' Chief reliance
appears to have been placed upon a previous Federal Power Act case of
which the Court said, "We said in Connecticut Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 324 U. S. 515, 529, 'Federal jurisdiction was to follow the
flow of electric energy, an engineering and scientific, rather than a
legalistic or governmental, test.' "74 Insofar as can be told from read-
ing the Lo-Vaca opinion, this statement is intended to support the
FPC's molecular theory. At least Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, treats
the decision as an adoption of the molecular theory under the facts of
the case, and the extension of this case to reverse the Eighth Circuit
position in FPC v. Amerada Petroleum Co.,275 in the Court's brief
analysis there made, tends to confirm such a view.
It must be emphatically remarked that the quoted statement, in the
context in which it apears, is diametrically opposed to the use the Court
now makes of it. Mr. Justice Jackson, author of Connecticut Co. v.
Federal Power Comm'n,"' made the comment concerning scientific
and engineering analysis of statutory coverage preliminary to demon-
strating that, though the draftsmen drew their bill in such terms, the
intent of Congress in passing the Federal Power Act was not to adopt
any such test. Instead, it was to preserve a federal type of regulatory
system and prevent it from becoming a unitary central government
system.277 In fact, the case stands for the proposition that legal and
governmental tests, not physical tests, should be dominant in regula-
tory statutes such as the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act
involving the division of powers between state and federal govern-
ments. It is a vastly disturbing thing to see a prior case cast in the role
of performing a precedential function opposite to that for which it
stands.
In its opinion the Supreme Court does not absolutely close the door
to the possibility of comminglings without wholly jurisdictional con-
sequences. However, the extent to which it has accepted the FPC's
molecular theory when measured by the facts of the case (in conjunc-
272 379 U.S. 366 (1965)
274 Id. at 488.
275 379 U.S. 681 (1965). The Court says the case is on all fours with Lo-Vaca. It is not,
but rather is a weaker case because unlike Lo-Vaca there is not contractual and volumetric
segregation, only contractual segregation.
276 324 U.S. 515 (1944).
277 Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515, 528-532 (1945). See the
Eighth Circuit's comment in Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 334 F.2d 404, 409-10
(1964).
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tion with policy declarations of extreme hostility to any means where-
by some gas might avoid FPC regulation through creation of an
"attractive gap" in which the states might not adequately regulate or
whereby a pipeline purchaser might "discriminate" for the benefit of
a favored supplier) leaves not much doubt that commingling in a
jurisdictional pipeline will prove enough per se to confer jurisdiction
in all gas sale situations likely to have business attraction.27 In reality
Lo-Vaca presents about as tidy a fact situation for non-jurisdictional
treatment as can be imagined, and it is not enough. Other arrange-
ments should prove even more vulnerable. 7"
In the view of the writers it is wrong to use the excruciatingly nar-
row technicality of loss of molecular identity as a basis for extending
FPC jurisdiction to gas which can be volumetrically resegregated. The
opposite result would not have compromised the flow of gas properly
within the Commission's jurisdiction. That it would have given rise
to a format in which there could be competing gas sales not subject to
FPC control is a conseqeunce of the structure of the Natural Gas Act
itself. That structure is the work of Congress, and correction, if
needed, is the province of Congress, not Commission or Court.
Even without this decision, the FPC already was in a position, by
virtue of the 1961 Transco case, 80 to deny use of jurisdictional pipe-
lines for transportation of gas intended for non-jurisdictional sales. If
implemented, this indirect control would have been sufficient to force
all future non-jurisdictional sales by means of such facilities, if con-
summated at all, to be consummated in jurisdictional rather than non-
jurisdictional status by the expedient of refusing transportation certifi-
tions in the case of non-jurisdictional arrangements. But this case
sweeps into jurisdictional status many existing deliveries hitherto be-
278 The Supreme Court's opinions in California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. 379 U.S. 366
(1965), and FPC v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 379 U.S. 687 (1965), have some implications
that commingled gas might remain non-jurisdictional if all producers selling gas into the line
enjoyed the same proportions of jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional deliveries. Given the
business realities of operating an interstate pipeline, this is an impossible condition to attain,
or if attained, to maintain. Such statements, however, do raise some doubt whether the
FPC's pure molecular theory actually has been adopted by the Court. Arguably, the decisions
rest on objection to any particular supplier obtaining a preference in deliveries of non-
jurisdictional gas. In any case the writers find it impossible to conceive a proportionate de-
livery situation which would be practical from a business standpoint. The backlog of existing
jurisdictional contract deliveries at the time a new delivery is contracted makes any propor-
tionate exception to jurisdictional commingling consequences purely hypothetical.
279 Though not mentioned by the Court in California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., supra,
note 273, the concept of a "bright line" dividing the federal and state jurisdictions, which
lies at the heart of FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964) and accompanying
text, will go far to bring all jurisdictional pipeline commingling situations into FPC juris-
dictional status. How could there be such a line, avoiding the case-by-case disposition there
denounced, unless the jurisdictional result of commingling is uniform?
280 FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961) and § V A.
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lieved non-jurisdictional. The evident drive to maximize FPC juris-
diction and approach unitary control of the industry was well-served
in Lo-Vaca.
2. The Florida Parishes Case
Apart from treating commingling as jurisdictional per se there is
another matter of interest. The 1964 City of Colton case2 . teaches
that the old dichotomy of predominantly national-predominantly
local interest, exemplified by the Court's 1925 decision in Peoples
Natural Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,"2 no longer shelters state
regulation when any portion of the line supply comes from connec-
tions across state lines. Suppose, however, gas is taken into a jurisdic-
tional pipeline on a jurisdictional rate-regulated basis and the sale for
resale occurs before the gas sold leaves the state. This is the situation
in the FPC's Florida Parishes case, 28 currently on appeal to the Fifth
Circuit.
The issue in this case is the right of Louisiana to regulate the rates
of sales from two interstate pipelines under circumstances where
natural gas is taken into the lines through jurisdictional independent
producer sales. Gas in one line is from Louisiana offshore and in the
other from Louisiana onshore sources. The sales in issue are to Louisiana
communities for resale before the lines pass out of Louisiana.
These sales had been under FPC regulation since the inception of
FPC regulation of the pipeline company operating the two lines. In
1961 the Louisiana Public Service Commission ordered the company
to apply rates prescribed by it, thereby precipitating regulatory con-
flict between state and federal regulatory systems.
Six of the twenty-one communities involved take gas primarily
from the offshore line and the rest from the line having onshore
sources. However, there is a loop connecting the two lines, and, to an
extent apparently not satisfactorily establised by evidence, com-
mingling of offshore gas with onshore gas can and probably does
occur. Also there may have been backflows of Mississippi gas into the
line with the onshore source. There is no doubt but that gas in both
lines reaching the communities is transported while commingled with
gas from the respective producing sources destined for delivery in
281 376 U.S. 205 (1964).
282 270 U.S. 550 (1925). Contrast Kentucky Natural Gas Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
28 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Ky. 1939), affrmed, 119 F.2d 417 (6th Cir. 1941), where
application of this test to the facts of that case resulted in a determination the federal interest
was dominant. On their facts both of those cases seem correct in the pre-1942 commerce
clause context in which they were decided.
283 United Gas Pipeline Co., 30 F.P.C. 560 (1963).
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states beyond Louisiana. There is no segregation of the gas ultimately
used by the communities, the offtakes depending on the day-to-day
requirements of the purchasing communities. However, subject to
possible lateral and backflow comminglings, there is no question but
that the source inputs in each instance are ample to cover the com-
munities' offtakes.
The Conmmissioners were agreed that the community sales for resale
which were dependent on the offshore line were jurisdictional because
that gas crossed a state line in coming into Louisiana. However, they
split 3-2 on the onshore line service. The majority's basic proposition
was that this too is jurisdictional gas because acquired on a jurisdic-
tional basis and commenced in its journey to customers on that basis
through a line that goes interstate. The Commissioners constituting
the majority were not averse to buttressing this position with refer-
ence to the commingling possibilities in the possible Mississippi back-
flows and in the loop connection with the offshore gas line, but their
essential holding is that sales from the onshore line would be jurisdic-
tional even though these circumstances did not exist.
The minority, reading the Natural Gas Act literally, first brushed
aside the commingling possibilities as not established by the evidence
and in any case de ininimis, then made the basic determination that
sales from the on-shore line could not be jurisdictional because the
Natural Gas Act applies only to sales of gas in interstate commerce;
in the act "interstate commerce" is specifically defined as " ... com-
merce between any point in a State and any point outside thereof, or
between points within the same State but through any place outside
thereof, but only insofar as such commerce takes place within the
United States. 28
4
The Supreme Court never has had a case just like this one before
it. However, as reasonably well demonstrated by the type of analysis
made in the 1939 federal district court case of Kentucky Natural Gas
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,2 " even in terms of 1938 commerce
clause concepts there is a powerful argument that facts like these were
in the exclusive federal regulatory sphere. Unlike a situation where
the transmission after interstate transit ends in a state and all consump-
tion takes place there, making the federal interest minor enough under
the constitutional standards of the 1930's to permit state regulation,
this line passes on to other states with its freighting of gas. This gives
rise to a very direct impact on substantial national interests, for the
in-Louisiana offtake rate must affect significantly the cost of service
2 84 Natural Gas Act § 2(7), 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717a(7) (1958).
285 270 U.S. 550 (1925).
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burden with which the balance of the flow passes from Louisiana. It is
no answer that the FPC could take account of the Louisiana Commis-
sion's ratemakings in its subsequent ratemakings beyond Louisiana,
for to the extent it has to do this it is deprived of plenary regulatory
control of the gas passing the state line. It is the federal interest which
defines the federal segment,28 not whether an accommodation can be
worked out.28
The argument for state jurisdiction in this situation has to rest
solely on the act's definition of "interstate commerce," in effect a
claim that in at least one respect the Natural Gas Act ceded to the
states, from the exclusive federal area, jurisdiction which they did
not previously have. There is nothing in the legislative history of the
act which supports such an analysis. Moreover, the Supreme Court as
long as 1947, in a case comparable except that the sale for resale
was a forwarding on toward the state line ultimately to be crossed
instead of a distributor sale short of the line, indicated a contrary
view when it said, "There is nothing [in the Natural Gas Act] ... to
suggest that Congress intended sales consummated before the gas
crosses a state line should not be regarded as being 'in' such com-
merce."
288
Another line of cases also gives insight into the probable Court at-
titude if this case reaches it. Though the Supreme Court never has
squarely faced the issue of producer in-state sales for resale short of
but leading to the ultimate sale to the pipeline purchaser who will move
the gas interstate, several of the circuit courts of appeal have faced
the issue on numerous occasions, each time holding such sales to be
jurisdictional, and the Supreme Court has given certiorari denied
treatment each time review was sought.88 Probably the leading case in
286 Cases cited supra, notes 3-5.
287 Cf. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
288 Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 688 (1947). This case was cited in support
of this somewhat obscure statement in California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., supra, note 273
at 369: "The result of our decisions is to make the sale of gas, which crosses a state line at
any stage of its movement from wellhead to ultimate consumption, 'in interstate commerce'
within the meaning of the Act." Remembering Lo-Vaca deals in part with a Texas offtake
of Texas-produced gas from a common stream and holds that offtake jurisdictional, it is
likely that the statement means if any portion of a jurisdictional body of gas will cross a
state line, the whole of the gas is jurisdictional at any point of sale for resale along the line.
289 Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 930
(1958); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 956 (1958); Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1957); N. B.
Hunt Trust v. FPC, 236 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 970 (1957).
The Court necessarily is committed to support these decisions by its decisions ousting state
minimum wellhead pricing of gas destined for interstate commerce. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.
v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955); Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 180
Kan. 454, 304 P.2d 528 (1956), reversed per curiam, 355 U.S. 391 (1958). Cf. United Gas
Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 1517 (1965), which case really
resolves all doubt.
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this line is Deep South Oil v. FPC,"' where the Fifth Circuit held to
be jurisdictional certain in-state sales from an independent producer
to a processor who, after stripping the gas for its wet component,
sold the dry residue to an interstate pipeline purchaser. The hurdle of
the act's definition of "interstate commerce" was surmounted by
pointing out that though no state line was crossed with this sale, in its
continuous flow the gas would cross a state line.
While it is true these are cases of forwarding gas toward a state line
rather than cases of offtakes for in-state resale to consumers, they do
make it evident that the sale for resale is not itself rigidly tied to
crossing a state line in pursuance of that particular sale.
On balance the writers believe the law today is that when gas is
taken into a jurisdictional pipeline on a jurisdictional rate-regulated
basis, the FPC has jurisdiction of any sales for resale off the line,
whether or not a state line yet has been reached. Also, when gas is
commingled in a jurisdictional line, even with metering and con-
tractural segregation, this too will confer jurisdiction over the whole
commingled mass at any point along the line. The interplay of these
two principles renders it virtually impossible to avoid FPC jurisdiction
where use of an interstate line is involved and the FPC is disposed to
assert jurisdiction.'
VII. THE IMPACT OF CHANGED COMMERCE CLAUSE CONCEPTS
Rightly or wrongly, constitutional interpretations do change. When
the impact of that change is confined at the constitutional level, and
the effect is to strike down federal and state laws which were valid
before the change, the result is logically supportable. 92 But when
radically changed constitutional concepts are imported into a statute
that was enacted by Congress in full acquiescence with earlier current
concepts, in circumstances where today Congress yet could write a
valid statute exactly parallel in effect with the intended effect of the
law when passed, and the Court casts its later-evolved concept back
290247 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 930 (1958).
291 Apparently in certain situations the FPC may not be disposed to assert jurisdiction.
Thus, in Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., -F.P.C.- (1965), opinion No. 449, a
producer was permitted to transport its gas commingled in an interstate line for use by it as
fuel in its own refinery without jurisdiction attaching. And see supra, note 267. If in its
discretion the FPC later elects to change this administrative policy, however, it is quite likely
the Supreme Court will sustain an asertion of complete jurisdiction. Federal administrative
agencies have considerable discretion in the jurisdiction they elect to assert, supra, notes
48 and 207.
292 Thus in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), which assimilates the fifth amendment
standards into a rule binding on the states through the now-current interpretations of the
fourteenth amendment, we find Mr. Justice Brennan evaluating and discarding a number of
past Supreme Court decisions upholding state law applications necessarily rendered invalid
by the new standard.
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upon the older statute without regard for the hiatus it has caused, the
result resembles a syllogism in which a tacit major hypothesis is
altered by an innovator; the innovator then making a conclusion dif-
ferent from that intended by the author. When this happens to a
federal statute, inescapably it means the Court has legislated, super-
seding the legislation of Congress even though in the statute not a
word changes.
So far as known the Supreme Court never has made meaningful
adjustments for this evident phenomenon. Certainly it has not done so
in the case of the Natural Gas Act.29 Instead it has followed a course
typified by developments under the antitrust laws where, as the
federal commerce power expands through Court interpretation, the
coverage of the laws progressively expands. 9 4 Whether or not this is
justified with the antitrust laws, the two situations are in no sense
comparable. A limited purpose statute like the Natural Gas Act, de-
signed to complement state regulatory powers as these existed by
plugging with federal regulation a specific regulatory gap, does not
invite or need such judicial ingenuity as may be required to combat
anticompetitive practices in the myriad, undefinable mutations in
which they can be raised.
Of course, if the Natural Gas Act were an aggressive statute, in-
dicating in its legislative history a purpose to occupy with federal
regulation more than the area constitutionally available to Congress
at the time it was passed, there would be some justification for what
has happened. There is nothing in the constitutional structure of our
national government which prevents Congress from enacting laws
overreaching current constitutional interpretations, though there is
293 In FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950) the Court acknowledged an obli-
gation to define the intended coverage of the Natural Gas Act in terms of the gap created by
prior constitutional decisions involving commerce exclusively subject to federal regulation.
Id. at 472. But, as Mr. Justice Jackson noted in dissenting, Id. 483-84, the majority, after
acknowledging this obligation, proceeded to define the 1938 regulatory gap in terms that do
not square with previous decisions, particularly Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 304 U.S. 224
(1938). The principle was acknowledged and applied by the Eighth Circuit in Amerada v.
FPC, 334 F.2d 404, 408 (8th Cir. 1964), reversed, 379 U.S. 681 (1965), without comment
on the Eighth Circuit's statement.
294 Compare United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), holding acquisition
of stock control in the sugar refining industry to be solely a local manufacturing activity
despite importation of raw materials and interstate shipment of the product, with Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948), outlawing local
agreements fixing the farm price of sugar. The unusual powers the courts have assumed "by
common consent" in the antitrust field is notorious. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (Mass. 1953), affirmed per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See com-
ment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter recognizing this exceptional situation in United States v.
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 363-64 (1961), citing Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933), where Mr. Justice Holmes stated that
these laws have "a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in
constitutional provisions."
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serious question as to the propriety of the Court accommodating this
overreaching with changed constitutional interpretations instead of
putting Congress to the amendatory processes contemplated by the
Constitution to establish a basis for the enlarged powers it seeks.295
But when a limited purpose statute is so treated, it seriously reduces
the role of Congress.
The changed constitutional interpretations enlarging coverage of
the Natural Gas Act are quite obvious when the effect is simply to
enlarge the exclusive federal jurisdiction segment, as occurred in the
1950 East Ohio case2 . subjecting in-state trunk pipeline transporters
to the act. More subtle is the process of translating what, in 1938,
were exclusive powers of the states under then valid intrastate com-
merce concepts into concurrent status, then subjecting them to pre-
emption. This involves not only a misuse of the consequences of
changed constitutional interpretation but, because the shift to concur-
rent status in and of itself is not sufficient, a mistaken retroactive at-
tribution of preempting purpose to a statute that has no such purpose.
Very likely this is what really happened where the case-by-case weigh-
ing of respective state and federal interests exemplified by the 1938
Lone Star297 decision was ousted by the 1964 City of Colton decision.2"8
Almost certainly it is what underlay the 1954 Phillips299 decision in
consequence of which producers and gatherers have been subjected to
the act for ratemaking purposes." Moreover, but for these cases, the
indirect control situations previously considered probably would not
exist, for had the Commission and the Court kept their attention fixed
on identifying the extent of exclusive federal jurisdiction as the
threshold question, without which there could be no application of the
Natural Gas Act, it is extremely unlikely that the appetite to achieve
indirectly what could not be accomplished directly would have de-
veloped.
There is a serious hazard in our method of law development by
successive case precedents when the original source of power is a
statute, as is inevitably the case in any federal regulatory scheme. The
system facilitates gradual extension of a statute without real reference
back, after a time, to the statutory source of power. Each new decision,
a little further departing from the statutory plan, becomes a largely
independent precedent for a further extension. The technique, of
295 Whittaker, A Confusion of Tongues, 51 A.B.A.J. 27 (1965).
296 Supra, § III B.
297 304 U.S. 224 (1938).
298 Supra, § III A.
299 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
300 Supra, note 85.
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which there are innumerable examples, is revealed in the following
quotation from the 1961 Transco decision.
There is a broader principle .... When Congress enacted the Natural Gas
Act, it was motivated by a desire "to protect consumers against exploita-
tion at the hands of natural gas companies." Sunray Mid-Continent Oil
Co. v. Federal Power Com. 364 US 137, 147, 4 L ed 2d 1623, 1631, 80
S Ct 1392. To that Congress "meant to create a comprehensive and
effective regulatory scheme." Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public
Service Cm. 332 US 507, 520, 92 L ed 128, 139, 68 S Ct 190. See Public
Utilities Com. v. United Fuel Gas Co. 317 US 456, 467, 87 L ed 396,
402, 63 S Ct. 369.301
Not once does this statement touch base with the underlying statutory
law or its legislative history, and for a very good reason. So tested it is
not correct. Congress meant no such thing as attributed it by this case
by case building block technique. It meant only to provide regulation
where the national power was exclusive, thereby making it possible
for a state that so desired to complete a comprehensive regulatory
scheme"° ' - a very different thing.
The sequence of cases whereby the Natural Gas Act first was
"loosened up" is of much interest. It starts with cases dealing with the
special problem of rate-regulating at the point of undoubted jurisdic-
tional sales for resale from a pipeline that is in part its own on-system
supplier from its own production and ends with one of these cases
heavily relied upon as a precedent for regulating independent producer
and gatherer sales. The transition is accomplished in terms of construc-
tion of the act, without inquiry into state regulatory power over
producer and gatherer prices in 1938, or, alternatively, whether such
power was exclusive in the federal government as of that time. Finally,
a preemptive purpose is assumed in the act without fundamental in-
quiry on that point.
In the 1945 case of Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, °a to estab-
lish the rates of jurisdictional sales by a jurisdictional pipeline com-
pany, the Court decided its on-system producing properties (actually
owned and operated by an affiliated producing company) could be
included in the rate base and a rate of return applied. This was not
done on any theory that the production was jurisdictional, but merely
because some basis obviously had to be established (the company con-
tended for "going field price") and the Court, in the previous case of
8O1FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 19 (1961).
302 Supra, § I. Even today not all states have seen fit to regulate local distribution,
certainly a major lack in any "comprehensive" regulatory scheme which no one can pretend
lies within any presently-enacted grant of federal power to cure.
803 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
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FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.8"4 had given the FPC a virtual carte
blanche in ratemaking methods used, so long as the results achieved
were not unjust, unreasonable or confiscatory. "' Both Hope Natural...
and Colorado Interstate3 0 7 carefully disclaim any intent to assert direct
jurisdiction over production or gathering, in a context which is un-
mistakably related to rate regulation.
The problem next appeared in the 1947 case of Interstate Gas Co. v.
FPC,°8 with the added complication that sales off the interstate line to
purchasers who would carry the gas interstate occurred before the line
passed from the state in which the company had produced the gas. The
company had avoided state jurisdiction of these sales on the plea that
they fell in the federal regulatory sphere, and in this case, by contrary
argument, sought to avoid federal regulation. The Court rejected the
"in-state-produced-and-sold argument," correctly placing these sales
in the exclusive federal pipeline segment to which the Act was intended
to apply, then upheld a ratemaking procedure comparable to that
approved in the earlier cases. Any intent directly to regulate produc-
tion and gathering as such was again expressly disclaimed, though in
this case it was, for the first time, suggested that producer sales in the
course of production or gathering fell in a concurrent regulatory area
where Congress had the power, though emphatically not the purpose,
to regulate. 0 9
That the Court then meant what it said with regard to direct regula-
tion of production and gathering is abundantly confirmed in the 1949
case of Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion,81 ° in which case the pipeline company was permitted to avoid
indirect rate regulation of production (and, prior to 1954, any FPC
rate regulation of production) by the expedient of conveying the
properties to a spun-off non-jurisdictional producing company created
for that express purpose. In the view of the writers the test thus
created was phychologically so adverse to the company's position that,
when the Court supported the consequences of what it had done, it
amounted unmistakably to accepting the proposition that rate regula-
tion of producer and gatherer prices was not included in the coverage
of the act, despite the fact that technically the issue was one of whether
804 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
805 Id. at 602.
306 Id. at 612-13.
801 324 U.S. at 603.
808 331 U.S. 682 (1947).
809 Id. at 690.
810 337 U.S. 498 (1949).
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an in-place sale of reserves was jurisdictional. The Court examined the
legislative history of the act at great length in justifying its result. 1'
After this case the 1950 case of Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil
Co.312 established that there was no constitutional prohibition against
a states' price-regulating gas production, but the question of whether
such regulation conflicted with the Natural Gas Act was reserved.81
This, of course, made the power at least concurrent, a matter of some
embarrassment to the Court in asserting exclusive FPC jurisdiction
four years later. 1 4
Throughout these developments the FPC maintained that it had no
jurisdiction of producer and gatherer sales as such..5 and, in its 1951
decision of Phillips Petroleum Co., 1' continued to hold consistently to
this position.
The appeal from that decision by an intervenor, the State of Wis-
consin, resulted in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision of Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,"1 7 the case whereby independent producer
and gatherer rate regulation was commenced. "' Instead of any effort
to find a jurisdictional basis consistent with the congressional purpose
in enacting the Natural Gas Act, much reliance is placed on the not-so-
murky 1947 Interstate decision, rendered murky, however, by selective
editing of the statements in that case. It is submitted that the very
most that can be made of Interstate is a basis of concurrent jurisdic-
tional status for producer and gatherer sales, followed by an express
Court disclaimer of any congressional purpose to use that power.
Thus, while Interstate takes the step of shifting to concurrent status
what probably was exclusively in the power of the states in 1938, it is
pure pretense to say that it in any way signalled the second step of
preemption. Under correct analysis it is inescapable that this was ac-
complished by the Court solely in the 1954 Phillips case, in the face
of square declarations to the contrary by the 1947 Court in Intersate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Were the Court ever to acknowledge the incorrectness of shifting
the meaning of enacted statutes through changed constitutional con-
cepts- and this is the fundamental flaw which underlies what has
311 Id. at 506-13.
512 340 U.S. 179 (1950).313 Id. at 188.
314 Supra, note 85.
3 18 C.F.R. § 2.54 (1949) revoked by Order 154, 15 F.R. 4633, July 20, 1950,
specifically exempted producers and gatherers.
816 10 F.P.C. 246 (1951).
817 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
s18 On its facts the case dealt with a sale by a gatherer after gathering was completed.
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happened under the Natural Gas Act - there exists a well-developed
doctrine whereby the result could be avoided and statutes kept con-
stant with their original meaning.
Regardles of the view the Court may have entertained concerning
federal powers under the commerce clause, it has always held itself
bound to defer to a congressional direction that state regulation be
permitted,1' even to the extent the federal power retires from a regula-
tory field it has occupied. 2 ' The Hinshaw amendment,"'1 ceding
regulation of certain in-state trunk line gas transmissions back to the
states, is an example of this process.
This doctrine has operated only to give back to the states what the
Court denied them by previous decisions. Yet intellectual and judicial
integrity suggest there is just as much reason to use the underlying
rationale of this doctrine as a construction device to avoid taking
powers from the states in any situation where Congress would have
undoubted power presently to write a law of like effect conformably
with the new constitutional concepts as the law it did write under
older concepts. 22 Such an approach would always force reconsideration
of a statute in the setting in which it was passed and end the unwar-
ranted extensions which occur through the method of building on a
statute by case precedents not constantly checked against the statutory
source of regulatory authority.
Certainly the Court would be hard put to deny that any regulatory
area under the Natural Gas Act could not be ceded to the states. This
being true, correct construction of the act certainly requires constant
vigilance in order that there not be preempted through the device of
constitutional change that which the legislative history, in an older
constitutional context, makes clear the Congress did not intend to
regulate.
Though the record of the Court's current majority offers little hope
at the present time, the logic inherent in the cession doctrine should be
pressed upon the Commission and courts in every instance in which a
new extension is attempted beyond the precise gap defined by Public
Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam &- Elec. Co. 2' and Missouri v.
The cases cited supra, note 289, demonstrate the consequent extension to all independentproducers making sales of gas, ultimately to be acquired by interstate pipeline purchasers
for resale.
319 James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R.R. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
820 New Jersey v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 372 U.S. 1 (1963); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
321 Supra, § VB.
322 Cf. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental
Oil Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 1517 (1965).
323 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
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Kansas Gas Co. 24 Though a decent regard for stare decisis will require
adherence to the erroneous but squarely-litigated extensions which
have occurred, there is no compulsion in that doctrine to follow the
trend of these decisions ever deeper into error. In time a consistent
effort to compel analysis of proposed extensions in terms of the correct
threshold question: "Is this a situation which fell within the exclusive
federal power to regulate in 1938?", may produce a pattern of refusals
to further extend which will be glaringly inconsistent with erroneous
past extensions. It is not beyond the realm of hope that one day there
can be decisions compelled by stare decisis calling on Congress to
rectify the excesses of the past. One hopes that Congress will act
promptly in the contest over legislative power which an unrestrained
Court has forced upon it without needing such an impetus, but the
assault on the federal structure has grown so grave that no avenue
of precipitating the struggle which impends between Court and
Congress should be overlooked.
Laying aside the destructive effects upon our legal structure and the
federal principle, the writers most emphatically do not agree that the
Commission and the Court have improved the natural gas situation.
In effect the Commission and the Court have forestalled the political
process by decisions which have anticipated need for legislative action.
Thereby they have created a regulatory mess of the most serious pro-
portions yet seen simply because it is not possible to press from a
statute not designed for the purpose the means intelligently to regulate
an industry. Only the Congress is equipped to set national policy in this
matter and write a statute with appropriate standards and means of
enforcement. The Commission and the Court seem to have forgotten
that Congress meets every year and is entirely capable of revising laws
sufficiently in need of revision when there is real popular demand for
change.
One cannot know how far Congress would have gone by now had
Commission and Court left the legislative process to it. Very likely
indefinite pricing clauses in producer sales contracts would have been
brought under control. Had this been done it is very doubtful further
extensions of direct controls over producers would have been necessary,
for the interstate pipelines proved no mean bargainers in the years
before real need to bargain was lifted from them.
Possibly there has developed a need for a somewhat greater degree
of centralized control over the transportations and sales of natural
gas than was the case when the act was passed. The intricate national
824 265 US. ;P8 (1924).
[Vol. 19:448
THE NATURAL GAS ACT EXPERIENCE
web of high pressure main transmission lines bears little resemblance
today to the primitive industry of 1938. But there is always great
value in preserving a maximum of local control consistent with the
technology of the industry as it develops. This consideration is much
too important a matter to be left to federal regulators whose drive
always will be to approach a unitary system of controls pleasing to
them, and the Supreme Court lacks qualifications or apparatus to
assess what is needed. This is something which can be determined only
after extended investigations and hearings conducted by the legislature.
But these considerations really are only incidental to more serious im-
plications.
Given the origin and purposes of the Natural Gas Act, it is the most
seriously, most persistently mangled statute ever enacted by Congress.
As such, it becomes the ideal ground upon which to wage the fight to
curb the regulatory agencies and force the Court back into its proper
judicial role.
The battle will not be easy nor the outcome certain. Any regulatory
step, rightly or wrongly taken, confers economic advantage on some as
well as disadvantage on others. A king's ransom would pale alongside
the values which are involved. Inevitably vested interests in preserving
the new status quo grow up practically instantaneously.
This makes it possible for the FPC to engage in the tactics of divide
and conquer, a process which it well understands. A recent manifesta-
tion was a speech by Commissioner Black in which he urged gas dis-
tributors to join forces with the FPC to roll back any effort by pro-
ducers to escape FPC regulation. 2 He said there is no effective com-
petitive market in the gas field and raised the hobgoblin of an effective
monopolization among major producers to drive up the price of gas,
should FPC regulation of them be terminated - as if there were no
means to cope with monopoly in our laws and Congress. To prove lack
of competition he cited the increase in field price of gas from an aver-
age of 6.5# in 1950 to more than 160 in 1961, then said "competition
may somehow have been at work; but it surely wasn't laboring for you
or your customers." Considering the first price reflected many early
distress sales and that increases since 1954 have been subject to FPC
regulation which, generally, has allowed prices considerably higher
than the 1950 average to be justified under the act's standards, these
tactics are little more than demagoguery. Moreover, it shows a most
peculiar understanding of competitive forces when price increases,
without more, are declared to prove the absence of competition.
825 Address by Commissioner Black, Annual Convention of the Pacific Coast Gas Asso-
ciation, Coronado, California, September 16, 1964.
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While initially FPC regulation taught producers and pipeline pur-
chasers to think in terms of public utility cost of service concepts
instead of hard bargaining, thereby probably increasing the price of
gas to consumers at an earlier time than otherwise would have oc-
curred, it is undoubtedly true that the purchasing pipelines have
enjoyed a stability of purchased gas costs under FPC regulation which
has eliminated some of the rate adjustment lag factor which plagues
utilities in inflationary times. And the indirect controls which force
non-jurisdictional sales into jurisdictional status, if to be made at all,
benefit those in the industry who otherwise would be bypassed and
would not participate in the business represented.
But too much is involved for narrow advantage to rule. The power
of the states to regulate as intended by Congress, which is to say the
federal system, is as stake. The ability of Congress to control the extent
and effect of its legislation is at stake. The very integrity of our judicial
process is at stake.
The world would not end if the Congress simply compelled a return
to the regulatory scheme it intended in 1938. But this is 1965, not
1938. The nation has changed and the natural gas industry, relatively,
has changed even more. Some of the jurisdictional extension which has
been accomplished by usurption would have come about by legitimate
legislation but for the forestalling effects of the usurption. Some of the
extensions, not needed when they occurred, may have become so em-
bedded into the national economy that it now would be unwise to
remove them.
Hence, what is really needed is a new Natural Gas Act which, after
careful investigations and hearings designed to claim for federal regula-
tion what now is really needed, leaves to the states the maximum pos-
sible local regulatory authority. Because lack of ratemaking standards
is at the heart of the chaotic conditions which have characterized regu-
lation of the natural gas industry, the new statute should make un-
mistakable pronouncements for these in each and every situation
claimed for the national jurisdiction.
But this is not all the investigation and hearings should develop.
With equal care the regulatory developments under the present act
should be studied and an unmistakable rebuke delivered the Commis-
sion and the Court for presuming to invade the legislative function.
If Congress intends to preserve its role of lawmaker to the nation,
which it progressively has forfeited by its failure to respond to the
usurpations which have occurred, it could choose no better ground
upon which to wage its battle than here, where the offense committed
against it is most clearly manifested and stubbornly maintained.
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